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INTRODUCTION
The Sixteenth Amendment took effect on February 25, 1913,
permitting Congress to tax income “from whatever source de-
rived,”1 and on October 3rd of that year, Congress approved a
tax on the net income of individuals and corporations.2 The Unit-
ed States regime for taxing international income took shape soon
thereafter, during the decade 1919–1928. In the Revenue Act of
1918, the United States enacted, for the first time anywhere in the
world, a credit against U.S. income for taxes paid by a U.S. citizen
or resident to any foreign government on income earned outside
the United States.3 The Revenue Act of 1921, the first major tax
enactment following World War I, introduced a limitation on this
foreign tax credit (FTC) to ensure that a taxpayer’s total foreign
tax credits could not exceed the amount of the U.S. tax liability
on the taxpayer’s foreign source income.4 While details of the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
2. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
3. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18. §§ 222(a)(1), 238(a), 240(c), 40 Stat. 1057,
1073, 1080–82 (1919) (§ 222(a)(1) provided a foreign tax credit for individuals, § 238(a)
provided a similar credit for domestic corporations, and § 240(c) described creditable tax-
es). The British had previously allowed foreign tax credits for taxes paid within the Brit-
ish Commonwealth. See Thomas S. Adams, Interstate and International Double Taxation,
in LECTURES ON TAXATION 101, 102 (Roswell Magill ed., 1932) [hereinafter Adams,
Double Taxation]. The Revenue Act of 1918 also adopted the so-called indirect foreign
tax credit, which allows U.S. companies a tax credit for foreign taxes paid by their con-
trolled foreign subsidiaries. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
4. For example, this allowed an American company, subject to a U.S. corporate tax
rate of 35%, with $1,000 of foreign source income, a $350 maximum foreign tax credit
against its U.S. tax liability. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 222(a)(5), 238(a), 42
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foreign tax credit have changed and the methodology for deter-
mining the foreign tax credit limitation has varied from time to
time, these two provisions still constitute the linchpin of U.S. law
taxing income earned abroad by U.S. citizens and residents.
A few years later, in 1928, the League of Nations issued draft
model bilateral income tax treaties for the reciprocal relief of dou-
ble taxation of international income.5 Today, the League of Na-
tions model still serves as the basis for the model income tax
treaties of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD), the United Nations, and the United States.6
Although treaty articles have become more complex, commentaries
more detailed, and some apparent loopholes have been closed,
almost all the major industrial nations—the members of the
OECD—have bilateral tax treaties with one another based on the
1928 League of Nations model.7 Indeed, the fundamental structure
for international taxation of income announced nearly seven de-
cades ago in the 1928 League of Nations Model Treaty forms the
common basis for more than twelve hundred bilateral tax treaties
now in force throughout the world.8
Despite massive changes in the world economy in the last
seventy years, the international tax regime formulated in the 1920s
has survived remarkably intact. To be sure, the complexities of
current U.S. tax law governing international transactions would
Stat. 227, 249, 258. This limitation was intended to ensure that U.S. companies and indi-
viduals could not use foreign taxes to reduce or eliminate U.S. taxes on U.S. source
income. See discussion infra Section III.B.
5. Report Presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on Double Taxa-
tion and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.562 M.178 1928 II (1928) [hereinafter
1928 Report].
6. Some early nineteenth century double taxation treaties are on record, such as a
Dutch measure dating from 1819 exempting foreign ships from the Dutch business-license
tax on condition of reciprocity. See Mitchell B. Carroll, Double Taxation Relief, Discus-
sion of Conventions Drafted at the International Conference of Experts, 1927 and Other
Measures 1 (Dep’t of Commerce Trade Information Bulletin No. 523), 1927. But the
modern treaty era began with the Prussian-Austrian double taxation treaty of 1899. This
treaty’s brief regional importance was primarily because it served as a model for several
postwar treaties entered into in the early 1920s by central European successor states to
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Like many other early treaties, the Austro-Prussian treaty
only applied to nationals of the two countries. In general terms, it followed a domicile-
based principle of direct taxation. See id. at 2.
7. See generally Adam Vital, The Strange Career of the Model Double Taxation
Treaty: A Brief Historical Outline (1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
8. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal
for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996).
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shock a tax practitioner of the 1920s, and the international net-
work of bilateral income tax treaties could not have been imag-
ined by the handful of men who fashioned the League of Nations’
model treaty of 1928. Nor could policymakers of the 1920s have
foreseen the integration of the world economy or the dramatic
expansion of international capital flows we take for granted today.
But, despite such developments, the basic structure of both the
1928 model treaties and the United States’ international tax law of
the 1920s governs the income tax consequences of international
transactions today.
This remarkably stable regime now threatens to come un-
glued, however. Calls for major restructuring of the United States
regime for taxing international income are commonplace. Some
claim that the recent emergence of regional trading blocs, such as
through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
and the economic and political integration of the European Com-
munity demand major revision of the taxation of international
income.9
Others believe that the international tax system has been
rendered archaic by the international expansion of capital flows,
especially of portfolio investments, the emergence and widespread
use of new financial instruments, particularly financial derivatives,
and the expansion of international activities by large multinational
businesses.10 These developments have enhanced fears of a multi-
national “race to the bottom” in the taxation of capital income.11
Some analysts now call for an exemption from U.S. tax of foreign
source income either on the grounds of simplification or to im-
prove the international competitiveness of U.S. multinationals.12
Such an exemption is used by many European nations.13 Exempt-
9. See, e.g., Colloquium on NAFTA and Taxation, 49 TAX L. REV. 525, 525–820
(1994) (discussing whether the adoption of NAFTA necessitates a change in tax laws).
10. Between 1970 and 1990, the percentage of United States receipts of foreign in-
come derived from portfolio investment grew from 25% to more than half. See Avi-
Yonah, supra note 8, at 1315.
11. A particularly outspoken official on the subject of “racing to the bottom” is
European Community Tax Commissioner Christiane Scrivener. See, e.g., EC Tax Commis-
sioner Outlines Priority Issues, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Mar. 7, 1990, at G–8. For a cri-
tique of the “race to the bottom” scenario, see Alvin K. Klevorick, The Race to the
Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy, 14 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 177 (1996).
12. See, e.g., GARY F. HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME:
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM (1992).
13. See HUGH AULT ET AL., COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL
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ing foreign source income was the proposal advanced in 1996, for
example, by the Kemp Commission on Tax Reform, a commission
appointed by then Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole and Speaker
of the House Newt Gingrich, and headed by former Congressman
and Vice Presidential candidate Jack Kemp.14
Probably the greatest impetus for major change in the taxa-
tion of international business income is that the “classical” system
of taxing corporations no longer exists in many industrial nations.
The United States retains a classical corporate tax, under which
business income earned by a corporation is taxed twice: first when
it is earned by the corporation, and again when it is distributed to
shareholders as dividends. Many of our trading partners, however,
have moved in recent years to eliminate or substantially reduce
this double taxation.15 The international tax regime, however, is
predicated on the existence of a double corporate tax. It generally
allocates the corporate level tax to the country where the
businesses’ income is earned and the personal tax on dividends to
the country where the recipients reside.16 A country’s unilateral
decision to eliminate either the corporate or individual level of tax
upsets this equilibrium and demands fundamental reconsideration
of the international consensus about how this income should be
taxed. Today, some countries, such as the United States and the
Netherlands, retain a classical corporate tax while others, such as
England, France, Germany and Australia, do not.17 In such cir-
cumstances, adjusting the international tax regime in a manner
acceptable to all parties is made even more difficult.18
ANALYSIS 380–85, 402–25 (1997) (discussing use of a foreign source income exemption in
the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, and France).
14. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX REFORM, UN-
LEASHING AMERICA’S POTENTIAL: A PRO-GROWTH, PRO-FAMILY TAX SYSTEM FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, reprinted in 70 TAX NOTES 413 (1996) [hereinafter KEMP COM-
MISSION REPORT].
15. For a discussion of the experience of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom with tax system integration, see U.S. TREASURY DE-
P’T, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDI-
VIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 159–84 app.
(1992).
16. See Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the
International Tax Base: Principles and Practice, 47 TAX L. REV. 565, 565–66 (1992).
17. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, supra note 15, at 159–84.
18. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 1356–59. See generally COMMISSION OF THE EU-
ROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON
COMPANY TAXATION (1992) [hereinafter RUDING COMMITTEE REPORT].
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All of these developments motivate calls for a fundamental
reexamination of U.S. taxation of international income; as a result,
proposals for change have flooded the literature.19 Some call for
taxation of international income only by the source country (the
country where the income is earned);20 others call for taxation
only by the residence country (the country where the investor
resides).21 Many call for retaining the present structure—here we
call it the 1920s compromise—but with substantial revisions.22
In moving forward, we need to be clear about what is baby
and what is bathwater. It would be foolish to deny the successes
of the existing regime. The system for taxing international income
put in place seven decades ago has witnessed, indeed facilitated, a
massive expansion in international capital flows. The current clam-
or for change therefore makes this a propitious moment to look
back to see what the originators of this remarkably stable and
successful system of international taxation had in mind. Surprising-
ly, this has never been done before.23
19. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 1352–53 (proposing taxation of individuals
by country of residence and taxation of corporations on a source of income basis);
RUDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 18; Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-
Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18,
63–86 (1993) (discussing alternative approaches for enhancing the stability of international
income taxation); Paul R. McDaniel, Formulary Taxation in the North American Free
Trade Zone, 49 TAX L. REV. 691, 702–38 (1994) (suggesting a treaty-based formulary
system to resolve many of the potential tax-induced distortions to free trade caused by
NAFTA).
20. See, e.g., KEMP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 449 (reprinting the Kemp
Commission’s recommendation that Congress consider a “territorial tax system”).
21. See, e.g., Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An
Analysis of the U.S. System and its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 11, 12 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990); Green, supra note 19, at 86
(urging the United States to move from source-based income taxation to a residence-
based system).
22. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 1303–05 (calling for a “new consensus . . .
to remedy the [1920s compromise’s] major weaknesses and ensure its continued viabili-
ty”); McDaniel, supra note 19, at 693–94; Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strate-
gic World with Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1757–59 (1995) (arguing that
Congress’ response to the “source” versus “residence” debate has been “an unprincipled
grab for undeserved tax revenue” rather than “considered reevaluation of . . . previously
accepted but obviously shaky policy”).
23. Earlier efforts to set forth the history of international tax policy include Alan G.
Choate et al., Federal Tax Policy for Foreign Income and Foreign Taxpayers—History,
Analysis and Prospects, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 441 (1971), and William P. McClure & Herman
B. Bouma, The Taxation of Foreign Income from 1909–1989: How a Tilted Playing Field
Developed, 43 TAX NOTES 1379 (1989). Such scholarship, however, has typically devoted
little attention to the formative period of 1918–1928, and has rarely scratched below the
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We endeavor here to set the historical record straight by
setting forth the “original intent” of the U.S. system of taxing
international income. This project serves several purposes. It has
become commonplace to attribute—we claim to misattribute—the
key role in fashioning the modern international tax regime to a
1923 report prepared for the League of Nations by four econo-
mists under the leadership of the Columbia University economist
Edwin R.A. Seligman.24 This reading of history overstates the
role played by the 1923 Report and, in doing so, it misleads mod-
ern policy analysts about the relative historical importance of the
tax claims of countries of residence at the expense of countries of
source. Our analysis brings to light the central role played in the
original formulation of U.S. international tax policy by Thomas
Sewall Adams, an economics professor at the University of Wis-
consin and Yale University and, crucially, the key Treasury tax
advisor during this period. If there was a founder of the U.S.
system of international taxation, it was T.S. Adams.
The international tax rules put into place by Congress, largely
at Adams’ behest—particularly the foreign tax credit—were not, as
some modern analysts seem to think, enacted to advance the goal
of worldwide economic efficiency by making Americans indifferent
about investing domestically or abroad, although they certainly
narrowed the pre-existing differences in making such investment
choices.25 Today’s common attribution to the U.S. international
tax regime, by both economists and lawyers, of a deliberate policy
of “worldwide efficiency” or “capital export neutrality”—a policy
of taxing U.S. residents identically whether they invest here or in
a foreign country26—overlooks the original primacy given by T.S.
Adams and the U.S. international tax regime to source-based taxa-
surface of standard legislative history. In contrast, this article draws extensively on pub-
lished and unpublished writings of key actors (especially Thomas Sewall Adams), minutes
of League of Nations meetings, and other archival material. To our knowledge, these
materials have not previously been used to relate the early history of U.S. international
tax policy.
24. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 1305–06 (claiming that the 1923 Report
underlies modern discussions of jurisdiction to tax); Ault, supra note 16, at 567–68.
25. See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS., FAC-
TORS AFFECTING THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES 5
(Comm. Print 1991).
26. See id. at 248; Robert Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform
of the U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. ___ (1997) (forthcom-
ing).
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tion. Modern policy advocates, of course, may reject the primacy
of taxation by countries of source, but they cannot properly claim
that such a rejection is simply a continuation of the original U.S.
tax policy toward international income.
T.S. Adams’ purposes, reasoning, and deep understanding of
how international income should—he would say “must”—be taxed
not only reveal the original intent of U.S. international taxation
but also provide important counterpoints to the consensus views of
modern economists about international tax policy today. We make
no claim here, however, that the original intent of international
taxation should necessarily constrain today’s policies. We have no
desire to become the Bob Bork and Ed Meese of international
taxation.27 Nevertheless, taking a careful look at Adams’ attitude
in fashioning U.S. international tax policy at the beginning of the
twentieth century provides useful lessons for reevaluating this
nation’s international tax policy at the century’s end, notwithstand-
ing the nature and scope of the changes in the world economy
that have taken place in the intervening years. Ignoring the wise
and practical views of Adams, the person most responsible for
putting this remarkably successful and durable system into place,
could well be folly. He has much to teach us about making inter-
national tax policy today.
I. WHO WAS T.S. ADAMS, ANYWAY?
Thomas Sewall Adams was born in Baltimore, Maryland on
December 29, 1873. After obtaining his Ph.D. in economics from
Johns Hopkins in 1899, Adams collaborated with his professor,
Richard T. Ely, and two others in producing the most widely-used
pre-World War I economics textbook, Outlines of Economics
(published in 1908).28 He also was the co-author with Helen L.
27. Whatever one thinks about the demands of a written constitution, the views of
yesteryear do not and should not limit the discretion of today’s tax policymakers. The
nation’s tax laws can be changed whenever the President and the Congress agree; chang-
es in tax treaty policies demand only that the President and the Senate concur. Like
Bork, however, we do brush aside many of the difficulties of ascertaining “original in-
tent,” by looking to T.S. Adams for illumination of the “principles” or “core values” he
sought to implement. See Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Econom-
ic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 826 (1986). We accept Boris Bittker’s character-
ization of this as something of a “fuzzy target.” See Boris I. Bittker, Interpreting the Con-
stitution: Is the Intent of the Framers Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 9, 36 (1995).
28. See 4 JOSEPH DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 211
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Sumner of the successful treatise Labor Problems (1905), but
Adams was far better known for his role in shaping tax policy,
particularly during the early days of the income tax, than for his
scholarly publications.29
While he was a professor of economics at the University of
Wisconsin from 1901–1915, Adams helped formulate and write the
Wisconsin Income Tax Law, the first successful progressive income
tax in the United States. The Wisconsin income tax became a
model both for other states’ income tax statutes and the 1913
federal income tax law. Adams served as a Wisconsin Tax Com-
missioner from 1911–1915.30 In 1916, after a brief interlude at
Cornell, Adams became a professor of economics at Yale, concen-
trating principally on public finance and advanced economic theo-
ry. In collaboration with Edwin R.A. Seligman, Adams drafted
New York’s first income tax statute that year.31 From 1917 until
his death in 1933, Adams combined his teaching at Yale with ad-
vice to the federal and state governments and to private organiza-
tions.
From 1917, when he was appointed tax advisor to the Trea-
sury Department by President Wilson, until 1923, he served as the
Treasury’s principal advisor on issues of tax policy and administra-
tion. During much of the period we are concerned with here,
(1959). For a discussion of Ely’s role in the early development of “law and economics”
theory, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law and Economics Movement, 42
STAN. L. REV. 993, 1021–25 (1990).
29. Much of the material in this section is taken from DORFMAN, supra note 28, at
214–221; T.S. ADAMS, 1873–1933 (A.E. Holcomb ed., 1933); W. Elliott Brownlee, Social
Investigation and Political Learning in the Financing of World War I, in THE STATE AND
SOCIAL INVESTIGATION IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 323 (Michael J. Lacey &
Mary O. Furner eds., 1993).
30. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the pre-Wisconsin income taxes and an
overview of the spread of state income taxation after Wisconsin’s successful experiment,
see ALZADA COMSTOCK, STATE TAXATION OF PERSONAL INCOME 16–18 (1921).
Comstock observes, “It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the success of state
income taxes in the last few years of their history has been due largely to the adaptation
and use of the plan of centralized and specialized administration which was first used by
Wisconsin in 1911.” Id. at 56. In addition to the innovations of its administrative machin-
ery, the Wisconsin tax was also particularly influential in its taxation of business income.
See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 629 (5th ed. 1988) (labeling the Wisconsin tax “the father of
twentieth-century corporate income taxation”). Adams describes and defends the Wiscon-
sin income tax in T.S. Adams, The Significance of the Wisconsin Income Tax, 28 POL.
SCI. Q. 569 (1913) [hereinafter Adams, Wisconsin Income Tax].
31. See DORFMAN, supra note 28, at 215.
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Adams was Treasury’s spokesman before the House Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee whenever
tax legislation was being formulated. From 1923 until his death in
1933, Adams served as the key spokesman for the United States
in the international tax treaty movement. Notwithstanding the
dramatic political shift marked by the election of Republican War-
ren G. Harding to the White House, Harding’s incoming Treasury
Secretary, Andrew Mellon, retained several high-ranking Treasury
officials from the Wilson administration, including Adams—a testa-
ment to their reputation for nonpartisan expertise.32 A contempo-
rary observed that “Professor Thomas S. Adams has been the
principal Treasury expert and adviser of Secretaries of the Trea-
sury, Ways and Means Committees, and Finance Committees”
under both Democratic and Republican regimes, and that his
influence was “remarkable” in light of the “bitter election cam-
paign of 1920.”33 Having previously served three Treasury Secre-
taries (William G. McAdoo, Carter Glass and David F. Houston)
under President Wilson, Adams became one of Andrew Mellon’s
closest advisers during his early years in office.34 President Har-
ding apparently cared little, and understood less, about tax issues,
gladly leaving these difficult matters to his experts at Treasury.35
Harding once declared, “I can’t make a damn thing out of this tax
problem. I listen to one side and they seem right, and then—God!
—I talk to the other side and they seem just as right.”36
Reading the transcripts of executive sessions of the tax-writing
committees reveals both the scope of Adams’ knowledge and the
extent to which Congress relied on him. Adams went through
draft legislation subsection by subsection explaining proposed rules
and the reasons for them. He advised Congress not only on the
substance of the law but also on the best style for drafting the
legislation. He often explained to the committees legal issues in-
volving Supreme Court opinions, opinions of the Attorney Gener-
al, and IRS regulations.37 It should be noted that, at this time,
32. See Benjamin G. Rader, Federal Taxation in the 1920s: A Re-examination, 33 THE
HISTORIAN 415, 421 (1971).
33. Roy G. Blakey, The Revenue Act of 1921, 12 AM. ECON. REV. 75, 90 (1922).
34. See id.; see also Brownlee, supra note 29, at 363.
35. See JEROLD L. WALTMAN, POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE U.S. INCOME TAX 83
(1985).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Hearings Before the Committee on Finance of the Unit-
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Congress had no tax staff of its own. The Joint Committee on
Taxation, which has long provided a professional tax staff to the
Congress, did not come into existence until 1926. The description
of Adams as the “father” of the 1921 Act does not seem overstat-
ed.38 Adams had no rivals for the committees’ attention. During
hearings on the 1921 Revenue Act, Senator LaFollette remarked
to Adams: “I have the greatest confidence in you and I think you
know more of the subject [of taxation] than anybody else in the
world.”39 John Witte, the leading chronicler of the political evolu-
tion of the income tax, describes Adams as “the leading tax expert
of his time.”40 The tax historians W. Elliott Brownlee and Sidney
Ratner also emphasize Adams’ great influence.41
Adams also enjoyed the great respect of his peers in the
economics profession. He served as president of the National Tax
Association in 1923, and also of the American Economic Associa-
tion in 1927.42 He apparently was the only person to hold both
positions until that feat was repeated by the Brookings Institute
economist Joe Pechman in the 1970s and 1980s.43
At his death in 1933, friends, colleagues and numerous pres-
ent and former government officials paid tribute to Adams.44
Henry Rainey, Speaker of the House, described him as the “great-
ed States Senate on H.R. 8245, 67th Cong. (1921) (Confidential Print for Use of Members
of the Senate), reprinted in 95A INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES
1909-1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (Bernard
D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
38. See Carlton Fox, Memoranda Concerning Whose Ideas Formed the Basis of the
1921 Revenue Revision, reprinted in 95 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1909–1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS
(Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
39. Internal Revenue: Hearings Before the Committee on Finance of the United States
Senate on H.R. 8245, 67th Cong. 256 (1921) (statement of Senator LaFollette), reprinted
in 95A INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909–1950: LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979)
[hereinafter 1921 Hearings.]
40. JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 91 (1985).
41. See SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 14 (1967) (not-
ing that Adams was “[o]ne of the greatest of American tax experts”); see also Brownlee,
supra note 29, at 350–53 (noting Adams’ “experience in legislative consultation, imple-
menting radical forms of progressive taxation, and conducting economic investigations”).
42. See Fred R. Fairchild, Adams, Thomas Sewall, in 11 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY 10 (Harris E. Starr ed., 1944).
43. For an appreciation of Pechman’s achievements, see Stuart E. Eizenstat, Joe
Pechman: A Passion for Fairness, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1989, at A25.
44. See T.S. ADAMS, supra note 29.
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est expert” on taxes he ever knew, and three former Treasury
Secretaries, who had served under four different Presidents, David
F. Houston (who served under President Wilson), Andrew W.
Mellon (Presidents Harding, Coolidge and Hoover) and Ogden D.
Mills (President Hoover), praised his enduring contributions to the
field of public finance and to the nation’s tax law.45 Most reveal-
ing, however, were two tributes from fellow public finance scholars
at Columbia University, his friend and sometimes rival Edwin
Seligman and Robert M. Haig. Professor Seligman wrote:
If there ever was a scholar in politics, Adams is a shining exam-
ple . . . . He wrote, indeed, only little, but every essay that came
from his pen was thought-provoking. His greatest qualities how-
ever, were his administrative and executive gifts, and his practical
common-sense, which enabled him to thread his way so success-
fully amid the maze of conflicting opinions and which made him
so valued a counselor to statesman . . . . In his influence on the
fiscal policy of the United States he will live as a fit successor to
David A. Wells, who played a similarly prominent part in the
Civil War.46
Robert Haig was also effusive, and, along with several others,
referred specifically to Adams’ accomplishments in the field of
international taxation:
However, closest to his heart during this period has been the
daring conception of international harmony and co-operation in
taxation, . . . [a] prize . . . to be won only by overcoming almost
insuperable obstacles. How substantial has been his progress
toward a solution I realized only when I sat with such men as
Blau in Bern and Dorn in Berlin, watched their eyes kindle with
enthusiasms and admiration for Adams and heard their expres-
sion of eagerness to assist in the forwarding of his plans. For, by
the force of his knowledge and his personality, he won the com-
plete respect and loyalty of this polyglot committee of the
League of Nations. Let us hope that its work will be crowned
with complete success. He would desire no nobler monument.47
While “complete success” in the field of taxation is difficult to
know, much less achieve, Adams did succeed in putting in place
the fundamental structure of both the U.S. tax law governing
45. See id. at 13–14.
46. Id. at 6–7.
47. Id. at 7–9.
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international taxation and the original model for bilateral tax trea-
ties, the two building blocks which have governed U.S. taxation
ever since.
The early formation of American public policies in many
instances has depended on the special talents and roles played by
a few leading individuals. In each such case, these leaders were
masters of both design and implementation. With the exception of
the Constitution’s founders, about whom probably too much has
been said, little is known of such men and the critical roles they
played in shaping American public policy. T.S. Adams was such a
person, a “prophet” in the field of taxation.48
Adams’ influence is well-illustrated by an anecdote from the
1922 annual conference of the National Tax Association. The
following was to be printed on the official program’s schedule of
speeches: “How federal taxes are made, by Thomas S. Adams,
Yale University.” However, a preliminary program read: “How
Taxes Are Made by Dr. T.S. Adams of Yale University.” Noting
Adams’ power and influence in Washington, the speaker introduc-
ing Adams’ talk joked, “I don’t know which subject is to be dis-
cussed this afternoon.”49
II. THE ESSENTIAL DILEMMA OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
Despite the seismic changes in the world economy that have
occurred in the last seven decades, the fundamental dilemma of
international taxation that confronted Thomas Sewall Adams, his
Treasury colleagues, and the Congress in the infancy of the in-
come tax remains essentially unchanged. When income is earned in
one country by a citizen or resident of another country, both the
country where income is earned (the source country) and the
country where the investor or earner resides (the residence coun-
try) have legitimate claims to tax the income. The basic task of
international tax rules is to resolve the competing claims of resi-
dence and source nations in order to avoid the double taxation
that results when both fully exercise their taxing power. Capital-
exporting and capital-importing nations have conflicting financial
48. For examples of other leaders in the history of government regulation in Amer-
ica, see generally THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984). We borrow
McCraw’s label “prophet” here also to express the “unusual combination . . . of both
theorizing about regulation and actually doing it.” Id. at vii–viii.
49. Ninth Session, 15 NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 329, 330–31 (1922).
FILE:C:\WP51\DLJ\GRAETZ.PP Dec 12/06/97 Sat 10:51am
1034 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46 :1021
interests: capital importers have the most to gain from taxation at
source, capital exporters from taxation of residents. Absent agree-
ment, residence countries remain unable to limit the unilateral
actions of source nations.
It is nevertheless surprising that the solutions to these prob-
lems first accepted by this nation in the 1920s—largely at the
behest of Adams—have remained so stable. Not only have the
scale and scope of international transactions changed dramatically,
but the Treasury’s views about the relative priorities properly
accorded the claims of residence and source countries have also
shifted substantially since Adams’ time. In its 1977 Blueprints for
Basic Tax Reform, the Treasury made clear its preference for resi-
dence-based taxation.
There are two basic prototype approaches to the taxation of
international flows of income. The first is the residence principle,
under which all income, wherever earned, would be defined and
taxed according to the laws of the taxpayer’s own country of
residence. The second prototype is the source principle, which
would require the taxpayer to pay tax according to the laws of
the country or countries in which his income is earned, regardless
of his residence. . . .
A number of considerations point to the residence principle
as the more desirable principle to establish. First, the concept of
income as consumption plus change in net worth implies that
distinctions based on the geographical origins of receipts are
inappropriate. Income, by this definition, is an attribute of indi-
viduals, not of places. Second, if owners of factor services are
much less mobile internationally than the factor services they
supply, variations among countries in taxes imposed by residence
will have smaller allocation effects than tax variations among
places of factor employment. Third, the income redistribution
objective manifested by the use of progressive income taxes im-
plies that a country should impose taxes on the entire income of
residents. The usual concept of income distribution cannot be
defined on the basis of income source.
For these reasons, the model plan recommends that the
United States seek, as a long-run objective, a world wide system
of residence principle taxation.50
50. DAVID F. BRADFORD, U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR
BASIC TAX REFORM 89–90 (2d ed. 1984); see also THE PRESIDENT’S TAX PROPOSALS TO
THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 383 (May 1985) (“The long
standing position of the United States that, as the country of residence, it has the right
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In 1996, the Treasury reiterated its preference for residence-based
taxation:
The United States, as do most countries, asserts jurisdiction
to tax based on principles of both source and residence. If dou-
ble taxation is to be avoided, however, one principle must yield
to the other. Therefore, through tax treaties, countries tend to
restrict their source-based taxing rights with respect to foreign
taxpayers in order to exercise more fully their residence based
taxing rights. . . .
In the world of cyberspace, it is often difficult, if not impos-
sible, to apply traditional source concepts to link an item of in-
come with a specific geographic location. Therefore source-based
taxation could lose its rationale and be rendered obsolete by
electronic commerce. By contrast, almost all taxpayers are resi-
dent somewhere. An individual is almost always a resident of
somewhere and, at least under U.S. law, all corporations must be
established under the laws of a given jurisdiction.51
In both of these statements, the Treasury echoes views of
Edwin Seligman, as expressed in the 1923 Economists’ Report to
the League of Nations, which plainly viewed source-based taxation
as illegitimate because it is not based on the taxpayer’s full ability
to pay, or “faculty.” The 1923 Report rejected the notion of an
exchange where the government offers services for payments of
taxes, stating that “the entire exchange theory has been supplanted
in modern times by the faculty theory or theory of ability to
pay.”52 Seligman’s Report ascribed source-based taxation to “ad-
ministrative cowardice or frailty”53 and argued that “as semi-de-
veloped countries become more industrialized . . . the principle of
personal faculty at the place of residence will become more widely
understood and appreciated.”54
to tax worldwide income is considered appropriate to promote tax neutrality in invest-
ment decisions.”).
51. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Selected Tax Policy Implications of Global Electronic Com-
merce, reprinted in BNA DAILY TAX REPORT, Nov. 22, 1996, at L–8.
52. Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors
Bivens, Einavai, Seligman, and Sir Josiah Stamp, at 18, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73
F.19 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Report].
53. Id. at 40.
54. Id. at 51.
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However, neither Seligman’s views nor those of the present-
day Treasury Department were shared by Adams and the Treasury
Department of the 1920s. Adams did not believe in the superiority
of residence and, although he rejected theoretical dogmatism on
both sides of the issue,55 he was clear about the primacy of the
claim of the country where the income was earned—the source
country—over the country whose residents supplied the investment
capital—the residence country. Adams endorsed source-based taxa-
tion “[a]s a matter of both principle and administrative conve-
nience.”56 Adams wrote, “The income tax is really a dual thing:
first, upon individuals levied in rough accordance with their ability
to pay; and second, upon income where it is earned.”57 Indeed,
Adams insisted that “[t]he strongest reason for the retention and
perfection of business taxation is found in experience and fiscal
history.”58 From “political and moral standpoints,” he offered this
“plain” justification for business taxes:
A large part of the cost of government is traceable to the neces-
sity of maintaining a suitable business environment. . . . Business
is responsible for much of the work which occupies the courts,
the police, the fire department, the army and the navy. New
business creates new tasks, entails further public expense. . . .
The relationship between private business and the cost of govern-
ment is a loose one . . . . The connection, however, is real. . . .
[B]usiness ought to be taxed because it costs money to maintain
a market and those costs should in some way be distributed over
all the beneficiaries of that market.59
Indeed, Adams regarded the “state and community . . . as silent
partners in every business enterprise.” The state, he argued, was
entitled to a “prior claim . . . upon profits which public expendi-
tures or the business environment maintained by the state have in
55. See, e.g., Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 125 (“I see little hope or
validity, in this tangled maze, in sweeping economic or juristic theories about the proper
or natural jurisdiction [pertaining to certain taxes].”); see also infra Section V.A.
56. International Chamber of Commerce, Resolutions Unanimously Adopted by the
Committee on Double Taxation 3 (Nov. 24, 1923) (available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale
University, Box 12, 1923–1924 folder) [hereinafter American Suggestions].
57. Letter from T.S. Adams to Edward E. Rhodes, Vice President, Mutual Benefit
Life Insurance Company, 1 (Jan. 5, 1923) (available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale Univer-
sity, Box 28, Jan.-June 1923 folder).
58. Thomas S. Adams, The Taxation of Business, 11 NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 185,
186 (1917) [hereinafter Adams, Taxation of Business].
59. Id. at 187.
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part produced.”60 He was clear that the U.S. should not and
would not forego taxation of business income earned in the United
States regardless of the residence of the business owners.61
“Business competes with business, not owners with owners.”62 He
added:
Income must to some extent be taxed where it is earned, at rates
and by methods determined by the conditions under which it is
earned—not by the conditions under which it is spent. . . .
[C]orporations and other business units derive benefits and com-
pete with one another as units, in the jurisdictions in which they
do business.63
Edwin Seligman was never convinced. In sharp contrast,
Seligman argued that the income tax was only about ability-to-pay
and the progressivity principle. He insisted: “[N]othing is more
firmly established than the substitution of the ability theory for the
old benefit theory in taxation. To do as Professor Adams now
attempts, and to blur these sharp distinctions, is to reopen the
Pandora’s box of confusion.”64
Ultimately, in addition to his view that source-based taxation
was justified by the benefits that the country of source provided to
private enterprise, Adams’ respect for the power of economic self-
interest and his insistence on solutions which were practical and
could be stable over the long-term help explain his preference for
taxation by countries of source over taxation by countries of resi-
dence. Adams declared: “Every state insists upon taxing the non-
resident alien who derives income from source within that country,
and rightly so, at least inevitably so.”65 Adams viewed source-
60. T.S. Adams, Federal Taxes Upon Income and Excess Profits, 3 AM. ECON. REV.
19, 20 (1918).
61. See Thomas S. Adams, Fundamental Problems of Federal Income Taxation, 35
Q.J. ECON. 527, 542 (1921) [hereinafter Adams, Fundamental Problems] (“If the members
of a partnership engaged in business in Detroit all live in Canada, and the partnership
competes with business concerns the owners of which live in Detroit, our people will not
consent to exempt the Canadians while the owners who live in the United States are
taxed on their entire income or expenditures . . . .”).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 542–43.
64. Edwin R.A. Seligman, Untitled Response to Speech by T.S. Adams, Taxes Upon
Income and Excess Profits—Discussion, 8 AM. ECON. REV. 42, 43 (Supp. 1918).
65. Thomas S. Adams, International and Interstate Aspects of Double Taxation, 22
NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 193, 197 (1929) [hereinafter Adams, Aspects of Double Taxa-
tion].
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based taxation as just and inevitable—most nations exercised juris-
diction over source and there was little value in trying to talk
them out of it. He further argued, “In the long run the business
unit or source will yield more revenue to the public treasury than
the individual; and the place where the income is earned will
derive larger revenues than the jurisdiction of the person.”66 Ad-
ams was committed to taxing business income, and viewed source-
based taxes as more effective at doing so than residence-based
taxes.67 He viewed nations that insisted on residence-based taxa-
tion as imposing an affirmative disadvantage on themselves, hob-
bling the competitiveness of their businesses abroad.68 Finally,
while governments had a profound responsibility to relieve resi-
dents of the injustice of double taxation, the more attenuated
relationship between governments and nonresidents did not dictate
such accommodation.69 Thus, in Adams’ mind, the case for source
over residence was even stronger in cases of double taxation than
it was in the abstract.
Adams’ preference for source had a defensive, as well as an
affirmative, aspect; he insisted that the right of the United States
to tax its own domestic-source income must not be sacrificed. As
we shall see, this caused him to ask for a limitation on the foreign
tax credit in 1921 so that U.S. residents and citizens could not use
the credit to offset U.S. taxes on domestic income.70 Adams was
not willing to imperil his own nation’s ability to collect taxes on
income produced within its borders.
Although Adams insisted that residence defer to source in
cases of double taxation, he never rejected residence-based taxa-
tion altogether. Adams viewed residence as an important backstop
to source-based taxation, which is why he generally favored credits
for foreign-source taxes paid abroad, rather than exemptions for
foreign-source income.71 Residence only deferred to source if
66. Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 120.
67. Adams argued:
[T]axes upon business have great fiscal virtue . . . . They are relatively inex-
pensive to collect and comparatively productive in yield. A given rate of taxa-
tion laid upon the business unit will usually yield a very much larger revenue
than the same rate of taxation laid upon the individual owners of the business.
Adams, Taxation of Business, supra note 58, at 187.
68. See, e.g., infra notes 115–23 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
70. See infra Section III.B.
71. Adams not only introduced the foreign tax credit into the U.S. law; he also
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source in fact exercised its jurisdiction.72 In Adams’ view, the
need for residence-based taxation as a backstop lay in his concern
over tax avoidance,73 which he found to be a problem of equal
weight to double taxation.74
Adams also saw value in residence-based taxation as a means
to protect progressive income tax rates, but he clearly felt that
some of his peers, including Seligman, exaggerated the importance
of graduated rates. Adams characterized “the will to tax progres-
sively” as “a sound enough objective within a limited field, but a
sorry substitute for the complex aims and objectives of tax systems
considered as systems.”75 Ultimately Adams concluded that “the
attempt to make the income tax do the work of social reform is
apt to spoil the income tax. . . . It is at best a substitute for taxes
which exercise a positively deleterious effect upon the distribution
of wealth.”76 Nevertheless, Adams did not regard doing business
attempted to impose it on international law in his work with the International Chamber
of Commerce and the League of Nations. See infra notes 193, 254 and accompanying
text. The FTC structure was also implicit in the Anglo-American Draft I-b of 1928. See
infra notes 259–61 and accompanying text.
72.
[T]he jurisdiction of domicile should usually grant an exemption only through
the tax credit, by which the taxpayer is exempted at domicile only when he has
proved payment of the tax in some other jurisdiction. . . . [T]he state which
with a fine regard for the rights of the taxpayer takes pains to relieve double
taxation, may fairly take measures to ensure that the person or property pays
at least one tax.
Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 112–13.
73. See T.S. Adams, A Suggested Amendment to Sir Percy Thompson’s Proposal
Regarding a Deduction or Credit (undated) (unpublished memorandum, available in T.S.
Adams Papers, Yale University, Box 17, folder containing undated League of Nations
materials) [hereinafter Adams, Suggested Amendment] (“To prevent tax evasion, the
relief in question can best be granted through a deduction or credit. . . . If the taxpayer
evaded taxation abroad he would be caught at home.”).
74. See Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 125–26 (“It is the opinion of
many persons familiar with the subject, and my own, that in international and interstate
trade there is probably as much evasion as double or multiple taxation.”).
75. Id. at 126–27. For a more complete statement of Adams’ views about progressive
income taxation, see T.S. Adams, Effect of Income and Inheritance Taxes on the Distribu-
tion of Wealth, 5 AM. ECON. REV. 234, 234–35 (1915) [hereinafter Adams, Distribution of
Wealth]. Adams conceded that the income tax should not be levied on the poor, but
argued that its burdens should be widely borne by all those capable of supporting them-
selves financially. He felt that a more narrow tax base would promote class conflict,
public extravagance, and needless administrative complexity. He further argued that “the
upper limit of enforceable rates is about 10 per cent.” Id. at 235. Adams seems to have
underestimated the enforceability of higher rates, although his calls for low rates and
widening the tax base foreshadowed subsequent income tax debates.
76. Id.
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abroad as an appropriate avenue to escape progressive rates on
individual residents.77 Adams knew well that progressive taxation
of individuals was not possible under an exclusively source-based
system, since it would require source nations to obtain a great deal
of personal information about residents of other countries.78 Ad-
ams thus felt that progressive taxation was best handled by the
nation of residence through a credit for foreign-source taxes paid
abroad.79
Notwithstanding Adams’ view that residence-based taxation
had a valid role to play as a backstop, it is quite clear that Adams
accorded a primary importance to source-based taxation. Adams’
contemporaries recognized that the foreign tax credit, Adams’
primary innovation, was a rejection of the primacy of residence-
based taxation.80 During the War, the United States had shifted
77. See Committee on Double Taxation of the International Chamber of Commerce,
Report Submitted by the American Section 2 (June 27, 1922) (available in T.S. Adams
Papers, Yale University, Box 12, 1921–1923 folder) [hereinafter American Section Report]
(“The American Committee [on Double Taxation] sees no sound reason why a progres-
sive income tax should be reduced merely because [income] is earned or derived from
more than one country.”).
78. Adams discussed some the administrative challenges in an argument against pro-
viding personal exemptions to foreigners taxed in the United States:
We have to follow it into the foreign country. Maybe the foreign country has
no income tax, although it has some tax which is somewhat similar. We have
no test of the veracity of the foreign citizen. We can not tell whether he has
10 children or 4 children, or whether he is unmarried or living with his wife. It
also means, if you want to administer it with any care and accuracy, that we
have to convert the foreign income into dollars in this country.
1921 Hearings, supra note 39, at 63.
79. Adams’ preference for making residence the custodian of progressivity may have
been reflected in his tentative attraction to the normal/super distinction proposed by the
International Chamber, though Adams ultimately rejected this model as incompatible with
the U.S. tax system. See infra note 187. As an alternative, Adams urged the International
Chamber to advocate the adoption of American-style FTCs, which, Adams noted, would
also protect the progressive rate structures of residence nations. See American Section
Report, supra note 77, at 1–2.
80. See, e.g., Mitchell B. Carroll, Proposed and Applied Methods of Preventing Dou-
ble Taxation, in DEPARTMENT OF COM. SPECIAL CIRCULAR NO. 122, at 29 (available in
T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, Box 13) (observing that under American law “the
principle of origin [source] prevails”). Adams’ pro-source position is also manifest in the
allocation rules of the 1921 Act, which were aggressive in taxing U.S.-source income.
Note, for instance, the contrasting treatments of dividends and interest in the 1921 Act
and the 1923 League Report: Adams allocates dividends and interest to the payor’s na-
tion (source), while Seligman allocates to the payee (residence). See infra note 149 and
text accompanying note 221. The “foreign trader” provision of the 1921 Act—which
would have shifted a large class of U.S. taxpayers to a purely source-based taxa-
tion—further underscores Adams’ preference for source. See infra Section III.C.
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from a debtor to a creditor nation but, as a result of Adams’
leadership, the United States did not argue—as did Great Britain,
for example—that the country of residence should have the first
claim to tax the income. Edwin Seligman described the American
approach as the “extreme converse” of purely residence-based
taxation.81 Thus, modern claims that the U.S. international tax
regime gives primacy to residence-based taxation should be under-
stood as a repudiation—not a continuation—of its original in-
tent.82
III. THE “ORIGINAL INTENT” OF U.S. TAX LAW GOVERNING
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
In the early days of income taxation, during the period
1913–1918, before Thomas Sewall Adams made his appearance on
the federal scene, U.S. tax law allowed only a deduction from
income of taxes paid to a foreign government.83 The direct offset
of U.S. taxes by foreign taxes paid—the foreign tax credit—did not
appear until the Revenue Act of 1918.84 Although there was no
talk about such a notion then, economists today view a system of
taxing worldwide income with only a deduction for foreign taxes
as furthering what they label “national neutrality.”85 Although
this is a form of neutrality in that all net receipts received by
persons in the United States are taxed the same regardless of
whether they have also been taxed by another nation, this label is
somewhat misleading. What “national neutrality” means in this
context is that U.S. tax policy should favor U.S. investments over
81. See EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, DOUBLE TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL FISCAL
COOPERATION 133–34 n.10 (1928).
82. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 25, at 88; H.
David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An Overview,
19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 359, 372 (1981); supra text accompanying notes 50–51.
83. See Choate et al., supra note 23, at 460 n.96.
84. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).
85. See Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and
New Approaches, 47 TAX NOTES 581, 583 (1990). The reasoning behind the international
tax aspects of the 1913 Act is difficult to discern from the historical sources. Some schol-
ars have concluded that “it is quite likely that Congress gave little or no thought to the
effect of the Revenue Act of 1913 on the foreign income of U.S. persons or the U.S.
income of foreign persons.” Choate et al., supra note 23, at 481. The decision in 1913 to
tax the worldwide income of taxpayers may have simply followed the earlier decision to
tax worldwide income in the 1909 federal excise tax on corporate income. See Corpora-
tion Excise Tax of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112–17.
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equally productive foreign investments.86 National neutrality re-
gards the domestic investment as better because the U.S. Treasury
gets the revenue. In such a regime, the United States will capture
the benefit of the entire pre-tax return on the domestic invest-
ment, either in taxes or in private after-tax returns to U.S. resi-
dents. According to this view, U.S. tax policy should encourage
U.S. individuals and companies to prefer U.S. investments whenev-
er the U.S. pre-tax rate of return exceeds the return on a foreign
investment net of the foreign country’s taxes.87 Thus, such a poli-
cy treats foreign taxes as costs of investing U.S. capital abroad and
allows foreign taxes to be deducted in computing taxable income,
the same treatment as for other costs of earning income.
This normative perspective contrasts sharply with a policy
directed toward achieving “worldwide efficiency,” which would be
neutral about a U.S. resident’s choice between a domestic and
foreign investment producing the same pre-tax rates of return. A
policy of neutrality toward such an investment choice (also known
as “capital export neutrality”) is indifferent not only about where
such investments are made but also about which country collects
the tax revenues from the income of the investment. Many econo-
mists and other tax policy analysts criticize a policy of national
neutrality, claiming that the nation’s tax policy goal should instead
be worldwide economic efficiency. But it is hard to convince a
U.S. President or members of Congress to put aside “narrow”
national interests to fashion U.S. tax policy in a manner that is
indifferent to whether taxes flow into U.S. coffers or the treasury
of some foreign nation. This is particularly true when the foreign
nation whose treasury will be enhanced is selected as a private
investment decision of U.S. investors, rather than as a reflection of
the foreign policy goals of the United States. To take but one in-
stance among many, Kansas’ Senator Curtis objected in hearings
on the 1921 Act to a relief provision for Americans doing business
86. See, e.g, Frisch, supra note 85, at 583 (describing and criticizing the “national
neutrality” viewpoint).
87. For example, if taxpayer A, a resident of country X, has revenue of 100 from
sources in X, and costs of 80, its tax in X might be .3 x 20, or 6. If taxpayer B, also a
resident of X, has revenue of 100 from sources in country Y, costs of 80, and must pay
a tax in country Y of 4, then its tax in country X would be (100–84) x .3, or 4.80. In
this way, A and B have both been taxed in country X at a rate of 30% on their net
earnings, but A enjoys a higher after tax return ($14) on the domestic investment than B
($11.20) on the foreign investment.
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abroad, stating, “Our people get the worst of it, and they ought
to, if they go to another country to invest. Let them invest in their
own country.”88
More persuasive in the policymaking arena has been the claim
that “national neutrality”—allowing only a deduction for foreign
income taxes—is doomed to fail on its own terms.89 Here the
argument shifts from the contention that worldwide economic
efficiency is a more worthwhile goal than national well-being to an
assertion that, when one takes the likely responses of foreign gov-
ernments into account, a U.S. tax policy that prefers U.S. invest-
ments, at least in the long term, will fail; a self-centered interna-
tional “beggar-thy-neighbor” contest will lower not only worldwide
economic output but also the national output of the United States
itself. This claim echoes the argument for favoring free trade over
high tariffs on imports, that a policy that seems to further the
national self-interest in the short-term will be self-defeating in the
long run. This shifts the political debate from normative disputes
over goals to empirical claims about consequences and to conten-
tions that the interests of the United States will be best furthered
by an international tax regime designed to promote worldwide
economic efficiency.90 Indeed, this constitutes much of the mod-
ern debate and, not surprisingly, claims about consequences are
often expressed in multiple empirical models of daunting complexi-
ty.91
A. The Revenue Act of 1918—Enacting the Foreign Tax Credit
Just as the enactment of a deduction for foreign taxes oc-
curred in 1913 without any talk of “national neutrality,” the move
away from this deduction to a foreign tax credit in the 1918 Act
took place without any political decision to shift U.S. tax policy to
favor “worldwide efficiency” or “capital export neutrality.” The
Sixteenth Amendment permitting a federal income tax had recent-
ly been sold to the American people on fairness grounds, and, in
88. 1921 Hearings, supra note 39, at 64.
89. See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 25, at 239–40.
90. See Frisch, supra note 85, at 583–84. See generally JOEL SLEMROD, FREE TRADE
TAXATION AND PROTECTIONIST TAXATION 1–28 (NBER Working Paper No. 4902, 1994)
(comparing international tax policy to international trade policy).
91. For examples, see the papers collected in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON MUL-
TINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (Martin Feldstein et al. eds., 1995).
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1918, arguments grounded in tax equity remained far more persua-
sive politically than notions of promoting more economically effi-
cient investments. T.S. Adams was then just beginning to create
the institutional capacity within the Treasury and Internal Revenue
Service to analyze the social and economic consequences of fiscal
and monetary policies.92 A politically persuasive case for free
trade policies loomed only in a distant future. Throughout the
early part of this century, America’s trade policy viewed imports
unfavorably, and Congress was soon to raise its already substantial
protective tariffs.93
Then, as now, international tax policy was “something of a
stepchild” in the tax legislative process.94 The big issue before the
Congress was finding the means to finance the war, in particular
the question whether to impose a war profits or excess profits
tax.95 Indeed, Adams initially joined the Treasury Department to
assist with the massive tax increases that would be necessary to
fund the United States war effort.96
This tax-raising occasion was an odd time for Adams to suc-
ceed in making the foreign tax credit (FTC) his first enduring
contribution to international tax policy. But, because the United
States insisted on taxing the worldwide income of its citizens, the
92. See Brownlee, supra note 29, at 363.
93. See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 124, 130 (1954).
Herbert Hoover, Commerce Secretary under Presidents Harding and Coolidge, “assigned
no small credit [to the tariff] for American prosperity.” JOSEPH BRANDES, HERBERT
HOOVER AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY 30 (1962). Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, the
other premier architect of U.S. economic policy during the 1920s, also favored protective
tariffs. See PHILIP H. LOVE, ANDREW W. MELLON 252–53 (1929).
American trade and fiscal policy during the period covered by this Article had a
clear mercantilist cast. President Harding declared, “[W]e must protect American business
at home and we must aid and protect it abroad.” BRANDES, supra, at 15 (quoting War-
ren G. Harding, Less Government in Business and More Business in Government, in THE
WORLD’S WORK 25–27 (1920)). After sweeping into power in the 1920 elections, Republi-
cans promptly raised tariffs (even before enacting tax cuts), reflecting a prevalent belief,
in the words of one contemporary critic, “that the tariff is the panacea for economic
ills.” Blakey, supra note 33, at 76. This mentality culminated in the famous Smoot-
Hawley tariff of 1931, which enacted the highest tariffs in American history. This pro-
tariff policy ultimately proved incompatible with U.S. insistence on repayment of war
debts and resulted in financial collapse in Europe and exacerbation of the depression in
the United States. See PAUL, supra, at 148.
94. The phrase appears in Ault & Bradford, supra note 21, at 11.
95. See WITTE, supra note 40, at 83–86.
96. See Fairchild, supra note 42, at 10. For a discussion of U.S. taxation during
World War I, see W. ELLIOTT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 48–66
(1996).
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pre–1918 arrangement permitted a form of double taxation, with
foreign-source income being fully subject to taxation both at home
and abroad. In 1913, when the American income tax was first
implemented, tax rates were low and this double taxation may
have been a comparatively minor nuisance. In 1918, however, with
the world at war and tax rates inflating rapidly around the globe,
international double taxation was becoming a far more serious
burden on Americans doing business or investing abroad.97 The
top marginal rates on individuals in the United States reached 77
percent, and although the basic corporate rate was only 10 per-
cent, an excess profits tax at rates from 8 to 60 percent also ap-
plied to many large companies.98 In such circumstances, additional
layers of taxation from other nations were potentially confiscatory.
Relief became a matter of some urgency.
In this context, Adams presented an extraordinary proposal:
the foreign tax credit, which he described as “[o]ne of the most
striking departures” in the 1918 Act.99 Under the FTC, Ameri-
cans could claim a credit against their American taxes for taxes
paid to other countries; taxes paid abroad would reduce American
tax revenue dollar for dollar.100 The FTC represented what was
an extraordinarily generous measure for its time: the United States
was assuming sole responsibility for the costs of reducing the dou-
ble taxation of its residents and citizens. As Edwin Seligman re-
97. See Proposed Revenue Act of 1918: Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 648, 649–650 (1918) (statement of Phanor J. Eder, Secretary,
Mercantile Bank of the Americas); see also Clyde J. Crobaugh, International Comity in
Taxation, 31 J. POL. ECON. 262, 262 (1923) (observing that problem of international
double taxation had recently “assumed great importance” due to wartime tax increases
and growing magnitude of international business transactions).
98. See WITTE, supra note 40, at 84–85.
99. Thomas Sewall Adams, The New Revenue Act, 108 THE NATION 316, 316 (1919).
100. The FTC was available unconditionally to U.S. citizens, but only available to
resident aliens who were citizens of nations granting similar benefits to Americans resid-
ing abroad. Compare Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 222(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1073
(1919) (credit for citizens) with Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 222(a)(3), 40 Stat. 1057,
1073 (1919) (credit for resident aliens). The FTC was not available at all to non-resident
aliens.
The 1918 Act also originated the so-called “indirect” or “deemed paid” foreign tax
credit, which allows domestic corporations credits for foreign taxes paid by foreign subsid-
iaries when dividends are distributed to the parent. See Revenue Act of 1918, § 240(c).
Subsidiaries incorporated in foreign countries are not considered U.S. residents and there-
fore are not subject to U.S. taxes on their income earned abroad. The dividends paid to
a U.S. parent, however, are income to the parent and the indirect FTC was considered
necessary to relieve double taxation on that income.
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marked, “[T]he United States is making a present of the revenue
to other countries.”101 In so doing, the U.S. unilaterally re-
nounced a potentially important bargaining chip in convincing
other nations to forego taxing their residents on U.S. source in-
come. Adams expected his proposal to be turned down because
the press of wartime financing made tax relief generally inappro-
priate in 1918:
In the midst of the war, when the financial burden upon the
United States was greater than it had ever been, I proposed to
the Congress that we should recognize the equities . . . by includ-
ing in the federal income tax the so-called credit for foreign
taxes paid . . . . I had no notion . . . that it would ever receive
serious consideration.102
Such generosity was virtually unprecedented. Great Britain,
for example, limited its relief from double taxation, also a foreign
tax credit, to taxation within the British Empire and, in legislation
in 1920, the British further limited its FTC to a maximum of one-
half of the British taxes on the foreign income.103 Yet Adams
101. See SELIGMAN, supra note 81, at 135.
102. Adams, Aspects of Double Taxation, supra note 65, at 198.
103. See Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 102. For a discussion of other
similarly limited unilateral relief measures that were in existence prior to the U.S. FTC,
see JOHN G. HERNDON, JR., RELIEF FROM INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RECIPROCITY FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOUBLE
INCOME TAXATION 10–14 (1932) (describing legislation intended to alleviate some bur-
dens of double taxation in the Netherlands (providing that foreign ships would be exempt
from licensing taxes only if their countries granted a reciprocal exemption to Dutch
ships), Belgium (taxing all income of Belgians, but providing for a lower tax rate on
foreign income than on domestic income), Norway (providing foreigners exemption from
taxation in Norway if their countries provided a reciprocal exemption for Norwegians),
and Switzerland (noting that the Center of Thuryan exempts residents’ foreign income
from local taxation if it has already been taxed aborad)). A few nations also protected
residents from double taxation by taxing only domestic-source income. See T.C. Jen,
Double Taxation 4 (1924) (describing income taxes of Australia, New South Wales, and
South Africa) (unpublished manuscript, available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University,
Box 29, May-Aug. 1924 folder).
Among the American states, New York was shortly to implement a new income
tax that provided a credit to residents for taxes paid to another state, but only if the
other state also had an income tax and provided a similar exemption for New Yorkers.
See Edwin R.A. Seligman, The New York Income Tax, 34 POL. SCI. Q. 521, 534 n.1
(Supp. Aug. 1918 - July 1919).
Interestingly, given Adams’ association with the state, Wisconsin also provided a tax
credit to prevent double taxation, though double taxation of a different kind: Wisconsin
permitted taxpayers to offset their personal property taxes against income taxes. See W.
ELLIOTT BROWNLEE, PROGRESSIVISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE WISCONSIN INCOME
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pursued his scheme because he felt that “it touched the equitable
chord or sense, and because double taxation under the heavy war
rates might not only cause injustice but the actual bankruptcy of
the taxpayer.”104
To Adams’ surprise, the FTC provoked little opposition (or
indeed notice) and became law in 1919.105 Adams attributed the
success of his proposal to the fact that legislators are particularly
sensitive to the charge of double taxation.106 Adams later ob-
served, “In my experience with legislative bodies I have found that
you can accomplish more for equity and justice in taxation in the
name of eliminating or preventing double taxation, than with any
other slogan or appeal.”107
At bottom, Adams objected to double taxation because it
offended his sense of fairness.108 From 1918 until his death in
TAX, 1911–1929, at 62 (1974).
104. Adams, Aspects of Double Taxation, supra note 65, at 198.
105. See id. The FTC was part of the Revenue Act of 1918, misleadingly named
because the law was enacted in 1919. Originally drafted in a special session of Congress
during the summer of 1918, the Act was passed by the House in late September; howev-
er, the Senate could not complete its deliberations until after the Armistice on November
11. Peace necessitated a certain amount of redrafting, which prevented final Senate action
until February, 1919. See WITTE, supra note 40, at 85.
106. See Adams, Aspects of Double Taxation, supra note 65, at 197. During the limit-
ed discussion of the measure, Congressmen focused on the great burden of double taxa-
tion, but also depicted the FTC “as a method to encourage foreign trade and to prevent
revenue loss through incorporation of foreign subsidiaries or expatriation.” Roswell Magill
& William C. Schaab, American Taxation of Income Earned Abroad, 13 TAX L. REV.
115, 118 (1958).
107. Adams, Aspects of Double Taxation, supra note 65, at 197. Before turning his
attention to the international arena, Adams concerned himself with the problem of dou-
ble taxation within the United States. In his first published article on taxation, a mono-
graph on the Maryland tax system, Adams identified the double taxation of debt as the
“worst defect” of the state’s property tax and argued that reform was necessary in order
to “satisfy our innate ideas of justice.” Thomas Sewall Adams, Taxation in Maryland, 18
JOHNS HOPKINS U. STUD. HIST. & POL. SCI. 13, 44–45 (1900) [hereinafter Adams, Taxa-
tion in Maryland].
108. To be precise, the problem at issue was not double taxation per se; Adams did
not devote much attention, for instance, to the double taxation inherent in the classical
model of corporate taxation or to the double taxation represented by the joint applica-
tion of federal and state income taxes. Rather, Adams was vexed by the concurrent
taxation of the same income by different nations. Seligman had long ago distinguished
between just and unjust double taxation: double taxation “is not always wrong; it is un-
just only when one taxpayer is assessed twice while another in substantially the same
class is assessed but once.” EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 98 (1900).
Adams’ focus on international double taxation grew out of a similar sense that what is
wrong in double taxation is discrimination: the person who chooses to live in one country
and earn money in another is singled out for a double dose of taxes.
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1933, Adams maintained a nearly continuous involvement in one
project or another to alleviate international double taxation.109
Even legislators, whose wisdom Adams sometimes doubted, re-
sponded to what Adams perceived as the manifest injustice of
double taxation:
There is something in the legislative mind which recognizes that
if one taxpayer is being taxed twice while the majority of men
similarly situated are being taxed only once, by the same tax,
something wrong or inequitable is being done which, other things
being equal, the legislator should correct if he can.110
Adams framed the problem of double taxation not as an issue
of economic efficiency, but as a matter of invidious discrimination.
Adams identified the ultimate culprit causing this discrimination as
the nation of residence: “More double taxation of the unjust vari-
ety is inflicted upon the taxpayer by his own government than by
foreign governments.”111 He elaborated:
Every state insists upon taxing the non-resident alien who derives
income from sources within that country, and rightly so, at least
inevitably so. Now, then, in due course of time, citizens of the
home state inevitably invest abroad and derive income from
foreign sources. The average state refuses to acknowledge in this
situation the right of its own citizen to a proper exemption on
income derived from foreign sources. It . . . refuses to recognize
when one of its own citizens or nationals gets income from a
foreign source that he inevitably will be taxed abroad.112
Given the predictability and the justness of taxation abroad, in
Adams’ view, the nation of residence wronged its taxpayers by
levying an additional tax upon foreign-source income, thereby
discriminating unfairly against residents who happened to earn
their income abroad.113
109. After completion of the 1928 model treaties, Adams joined the newly-formed
permanent Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations. In this capacity, he focused on
the problem of apportionment of international business income, but died before this pro-
ject produced any concrete results. For a discussion of the history of the apportionment
project, see Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law: Benefits for American Investors
and Enterprises Abroad, 2 INT’L LAW 692, 702–07 (1968).
110. Adams, Aspects of Double Taxation, supra note 65, at 197.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 197–98.
113. Some would argue that a government is justified in discriminating against those
who do business abroad—in particular, that there may be something unpatriotic in send-
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Though Adams felt, as a matter of principle, that nations
should work to alleviate the double taxation of their residents,
and, during the limited discussion of the measure, members of
Congress focused on the great burden of double taxation and the
urgency of relieving it given wartime tax rates, other factors also
played a role. In particular, there was a growing recognition of a
need to encourage private investments by Americans in Europe.
Adams also believed that the United States would reap practical
benefits from providing relief to its own taxpayers; he was con-
vinced that a discriminatory tax system that imposed unconsciona-
bly high rates on some taxpayers would ultimately prove to be
unenforceable.114
Moreover, Adams generally shared the sentiments about busi-
ness of the Administrations for which he worked;115 he believed
American prosperity depended in large measure on the competi-
tiveness of American business abroad.116 Certain members of
Congress also depicted the FTC “as a method to encourage for-
eign trade and to prevent revenue loss through incorporation of
foreign subsidiaries or expatriation.”117 Trade abroad was consid-
ered crucial to the nation’s economic well-being and was thought
to require appropriate support from the government.118 Relief
ing one’s capital abroad. During hearings on the 1921 Act, for instance, as we have
pointed out, Senator Curtis voiced this objection. See supra text accompanying note 88.
But this was plainly not Adams’ position. Nor was it the prevailing view of the post-war
American government. See infra note 118.
114. See Adams, Distribution of Wealth, supra note 75, at 235 (“To enforce a pro-
gressive income tax the cooperation of the taxpayer must be secured. But to secure his
cooperation the rates must be fair and reasonable.”); see also infra note 310 and accom-
panying text.
115. See BRANDES, supra note 93, at 12 (“Throughout Hoover’s term as Secretary
[1921–1928] the Department of Commerce spared no effort in acting on the policy that
exports were a key to business stability and thus to American prosperity.”).
116. See infra text accompanying notes 118–23.
117. Magill & Schaab, supra note 106, at 118.
118. In the 1920s, the locus of this support was Herbert Hoover’s Department of
Commerce. For a description of the Department’s aggressive efforts to assist American
business abroad, see BRANDES, supra note 93, at 10–15. In this vein, the Department
took an active interest in the international tax issues on which Adams worked, maintain-
ing a vigilant eye on both the FTC, see infra note 148 and accompanying text, and the
work of the League of Nations. With respect to the League, for instance, the Depart-
ment of Commerce played a role in the decision to send Adams to London and Geneva
as the U.S. representative on the Committee of Experts, see Adams Choice Here for
Parley Abroad to Ease Trade Tax, N.Y. J. COM., Dec. 28, 1926 (reproduced from Na-
tional Archives), and dispatched its own foreign tax officer to act as Adams’ assistant at
the meetings. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at 65. All of this suggests the importance
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from double taxation constituted just such appropriate support.119
And there is some evidence that Adams had this policy in mind in
his international tax efforts. His close associate, Mitchell Carroll,
characterized Adams’ FTC in this way:
The American credit system is ideal for a wealthy nation that
desires to encourage the expansion of its foreign trade, and is
willing to afford relief from double taxation to its own citizens or
residents . . . . The United States says, in effect, to its citi-
zens—go abroad and trade. If you have to pay tax on your earn-
ings in foreign countries, show me your tax bill and I will give
you relief . . . .120
of export-promotion to Adams’ work on international tax.
While the Department of Commerce’s preference was perhaps for exporting goods,
and not capital, the international balance of payments was such that export of goods
after World War I depended upon the export of capital, see infra notes 124–28 and ac-
companying text, and, in any case, the United States was perceived to have a surplus of
financial capital, see BRANDES, supra note 93, at 160, 163. Moreover, Europe’s high tariff
barriers made the export of finished goods rather difficult; American firms thus found it
increasingly profitable to invest in manufacturing subsidiaries abroad, the sales of which
were free from tariffs, rather than selling wholly American-made goods. See FRANK A.
SOUTHARD, JR., AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN EUROPE 115–19 (1931). In sum, there was little
sense in systematically treating the export of capital less favorably than the export of
goods, and, in fact, the Department of Commerce generally encouraged investment
abroad. See BRANDES, supra note 93, at 163. However, the United States government did
sometimes act to discourage American firms from building manufacturing facilities abroad,
fearing U.S. job losses. See MIRA WILKINS, THE MATURING OF MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISE: AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 1914 TO 1970, at 95, 162 (1974). Moreover, the
government also encouraged American bankers to require that loans abroad be used to
purchase American-made goods when available. See BRANDES, supra note 93, at 157, 160.
While the American government leaned overall towards encouragement of the ex-
port of capital, the import of capital seems to have been somewhat less of a priority, un-
derstandably so, given the dearth of capital in post-war Europe. Indeed, much of the
meager post-war investment by European firms in the United States was funded with
U.S. capital. See SOUTHARD, supra, at 200.
119. Such relief was also consistent with the Department of Commerce’s desire to
maintain comparatively low taxes for U.S. businesses selling U.S. products abroad in
order to offset relatively high domestic labor costs, thus reducing the incentive for firms
to move operations (and jobs) overseas. See BRANDES, supra note 93, at 168 (discussing
the Department of Commerce’s advice to firms considering moving overseas to take
advantage of lower labor costs).
120. Mitchell B. Carroll, The Double Taxation Conference 28–29 (Sept. 3, 1927) (un-
published manuscript, available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, Box 16, Sept.
1927 folder). Congress also tended to view the FTC as an export-enhancing device, an
attribute of the FTC that was discussed when it was originally adopted in 1918, see
Magill & Schaab, supra note 106, at 188, and that helped preserve the FTC against an
assault by the House Ways and Means Committee in 1933, see id. at 120.
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Adams himself made clear that some of the reforms he presented
in the 1921 Act had the competitiveness of American businesses in
mind.121 And he carried similar concerns with him into his tax
treaty work:
[Legislation authorizing U.S. negotiation of tax treaties] will en-
able the businessmen of this country to compete on somewhat
fairer terms with the business men [sic] of those foreign countries
which have the benefit of conventions or treaties of this kind
protecting them from the burdens of international double taxa-
tion.122
Perhaps such concerns over international competitiveness
explain Adams’ statement during the League of Nations’ interna-
tional tax treaty process that “[e]ach State should be eager, for
selfish and economic reasons, to relieve its own nationals and
residents from that measure of double taxation which is due to its
own legislation.”123 For Adams, political principle and national
self-interest coalesced around the issue of international double
taxation. Particularly in light of the global increase in tax rates due
to World War I, he found it imperative to relieve such taxation,
first by adopting the bold measure of the FTC.
By the end of 1918, the United States had another reason to
favor relief for Americans investing abroad: A variety of American
economic and diplomatic interests required that a substantial quan-
tity of American capital be channeled to rebuild post-war Europe.
The United States was owed eleven billion dollars by allied gov-
ernments for wartime loans;124 somehow Europe would need ac-
cess to American dollars to pay off this debt.125 Europe would
121. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
122. Adams, Aspects of Double Taxation, supra note 65, at 194. Adams’ associate,
John Herndon, further observed that such concern over American businesses being left
out of favorable foreign tax treaties was one of the major reasons the United States
decided to participate in the model treaty effort in the first place. See HERNDON, supra
note 103, at 64–65.
123. T.S. Adams, Draft Convention Proposed by Professor Adams, League of Nations
Doc. D.T.120, at 2 (1927) (available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, Box 16, Apr.
1927 folder) [hereinafter Adams, Draft Convention].
124. See BRANDES, supra note 93, at 171.
125. For a general discussion of the history of the war debts in the 1920s, see id. at
170–80. American allies objected vociferously to U.S. insistence on full repayment, tagging
the United States with the label “Uncle Shylock.” Id. at 170. After the war, the United
States gave a brief respite to its allies, but ultimately applied economic sanctions in order
to force its debtors to enter into repayment agreements, which most did between 1923
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also need American dollars to purchase American exports—a
central goal of American economic policy.126 Given the U.S. an-
tipathy to imports and its high tariffs, it was difficult for Europe-
ans to sell goods to the United States. Moreover, the wartime dev-
astation of Europe’s human, physical, and financial capital made
serious competition in American markets unlikely. If dollars could
not be raised through sales, another possibility was loan forgive-
ness or other public financing of European recovery by the Ameri-
can government. However, domestic politics in the United States
were very different after World War I than after World War II.
Americans wanted smaller government, lower taxes, and fewer
international entanglements. Americans would not tolerate loan
forgiveness, much less a Marshall Plan, to aid Europe at a time
when the United States government was itself sagging beneath
what it considered an enormous wartime debt.127 In sum, if Eu-
and 1926. See id. at 173–79.
Ultimately, the debt issue was about more than just inter-allied relations: U.S. insis-
tence on debt repayment forced the Allies to press Germany for war reparations, which
amounted to $33 billion. See id. at 180. The American government perceived that the re-
building of Germany was vital to the future prospects for peace in Europe, see id. at
182, and, in 1924, in order to relieve the financial pressures imposed by reparations, ad-
vanced a substantial loan to Germany and encouraged private American investment in
the German recovery, see id. at 183.
126. American interest in exporting to Europe did not abate even during wartime. For
instance, in April of 1918, Congress passed the Webb-Pomerene bill, which permitted
U.S. businesses to join together for exporting purposes notwithstanding antitrust laws. The
purpose of this bill was to give American exporters greater leverage in negotiating with
cartels of European buyers. See WILKINS, supra note 118, at 49–50.
Historically, Europe was the greatest market for American exports, taking 64% of
total U.S. exports in 1914. See SIDNEY RATNER ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMER-
ICAN ECONOMY 386–87 (1979). Prior to World War I, the United States had been a net
exporter of goods and services for four decades, but a net importer of capital. See id. at
385. Although the book value of U.S. investments abroad increased from $94 billion to
$478 billion between 1897 and 1914, see WILKINS, supra note 118, at 17–18, it took
World War I to transform the United States into a net exporter of capital, see id. at 30.
Exports of capital would need to remain high to fund the continued purchase of Ameri-
can goods in Europe, on which the American economy had increasingly come to rely.
The total value of American exports had more than doubled between 1914 and 1916
alone. See Harry N. Scheiber, World War I as Entrepreneurial Opportunity: Willard
Straight and the American International Corporation, 84 POL. SCI. Q. 486, 497 (1969).
During the postwar era, it was a commonplace observation that American capital
would need to be sent abroad in order to maintain and expand the sale of American
goods in other countries: “The American banker and American salesman must go
abroad.” Id. at 509 (quoting Henry A. Wise Wood, Planning the Future America, 72
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 22 (1917)). Indeed, even during wartime, the
authorization of loans to European nations was largely motivated by the desire to sup-
port American exports. See Scheiber, supra, at 494.
127. See Paul P. Abrahams, American Bankers and the Economic Tactics of Peace:
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rope was going to get the dollars necessary for the repayment of
its debts, the purchase of American exports, and the economic
stability necessary for peace, the source would have to be private
investment.128
Accordingly, the United States undertook a number of initia-
tives in 1918 and 1919 to encourage investment abroad.129 Per-
haps the most noteworthy initiative, in addition to the foreign tax
credit, was the Edge Act, passed by Congress in late 1919, which
promoted the development of federally-chartered banking enter-
prises designed to channel private domestic capital to European
reconstruction.130
Ultimately the foreign tax credit was only a small part of a
large, complex, and ultimately controversial bill. In addition to
sharp increases in corporate and individual income taxes (though
not sharp enough for some progressives), the 1918 Act introduced
a brand new war profits tax to limit war profiteering, a provision
that provoked much attention and debate, and which clearly over-
shadowed the FTC in importance.131 Although the 1918 Act con-
stituted the largest single tax increase of the war years, because it
was not actually enacted until after the Armistice, this legislation
1919, 56 J. AM. HIST. 572, 573, 583 (1969).
128. Observing these imperatives, incoming Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover
urged greater investment in Europe in a speech to the American Bankers’ Association,
arguing that such investments would raise “the capacity of foreign people to purchase
American goods and to repay obligations to the United States.” BRANDES, supra note 93,
at 152 (quoting Herbert Hoover, speech to the American Banker’s Association (Dec. 10,
1920)). Hoover set out important qualifications and also insisted that loans be extended
through private channels and that they be carefully tailored to achieve productive pur-
poses. See id.
Connecting these imperatives with international tax policy, George May, an Ameri-
can businessman who worked with Adams in the International Chamber of Commerce’s
double taxation initiative, argued that the United States was compelled to relieve double
taxation because “[o]ur own country could hardly maintain its policies of restriction of
imports through high tariffs, exportation of surplus food products, collection of foreign
government debts and the building up of a merchant marine, without making foreign
investments to balance the international account.” George O. May, Double Taxation, 5
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 69, 69 (1926).
129. See Abrahams, supra note 127, at 576–78.
130. For a full description and history of the Edge Act, see id. at 577–83. Abrahams
argues that the Edge Act was a response to the tension between U.S. trade and fiscal
policies after World War I: “As the Americans saw it, the problem was to keep respon-
sibility for the war-debt payments in Europe and at the same time give the Europeans
enough financial breathing space to reconstruct their economy, restore the trade network,
and earn enough dollars to pay their debts and buy American exports.” Id. at 575
131. See WITTE, supra note 40, at 85.
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also incorporated a number of long-term tax relief provisions, such
as automatic phased-in reductions in corporate and individual tax
rates beginning with the 1919 tax year.132 Thus, the FTC, while
an anomalous tax relief provision pre-Armistice, was rather more
consistent with the overall spirit of the 1918 Act by the time it
became law.
B. The 1921 Act—Limiting the FTC and Enacting Specific Source
Rules
With the FTC, Congress put into place the centerpiece of an
American international tax scheme that persists to this day: the
United States taxes non-residents on U.S.-source income,133 and
residents and citizens on world-wide income, but allows the latter
to offset their U.S. tax liability with a credit for income taxes paid
abroad to alleviate double taxation. Though the Revenue Act of
1921 retained this basic structure, Adams returned to Capitol Hill
once again as spokesman for the Treasury Department to urge a
number of significant refinements to the mechanism.
The most important of these reforms was a limitation on the
FTC. As originally devised, the FTC could be used to offset up to
the full amount of any U.S. “income, war profits and excess-profits
taxes” owed by an American taxpayer.134 Thus, an American
with substantial investments abroad, particularly if made in a high-
tax nation (or nations), might eliminate his entire tax bill to the
United States. Such an unlimited feature of a foreign tax credit in
fact furthers the principle of capital export neutrality because,
under such a regime, decisions about where to make investments
turn only on comparing pre-tax rates of return even when the
132. See id. at 85–86.
133. Foreign businesses doing business in the United States were taxed on their net
income from U.S. sources. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 1, 112–17
(taxing income of foreign corporations from “business transacted and capital invested
within the United States”); see also Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(c), 40 Stat. 1057,
1065–66 (1919) (providing for taxes on profits from the manufacture and disposition of
goods within the United States by nonresident alien individuals).
In order to facilitate collection of taxes from nonresident aliens, the 1918 Act re-
quired American payors of fixed or determinable annual or periodic income to withhold
a percentage of the income. See Revenue Act of 1918, § 221. Such withholding taxes
have become another fixture of U.S. international tax policy, although today, unlike un-
der the 1918 and 1921 Acts, these “withholding taxes” are in fact final taxes, not subject
to offsetting deductions and credits.
134. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 222(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1073 (1919).
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foreign tax rate is higher than the domestic tax rate. But neither
Adams nor Congress was thinking about achieving such neutrality
during this period, and both regarded the limitless FTC in 1921 as
creating the potential for “abuse.”135 With the high U.S. tax rates
obtaining in 1918 and 1919, the ability of the FTC to erase U.S.
tax liability was not readily apparent. By 1921, however, U.S. rates
had fallen considerably and were in the process of being reduced
further.136 Meanwhile, European nations maintained their higher
rates. For instance, in 1921 the “normal tax” (i.e., the base rate
applied to the lowest income categories) was 10 percent in the
United States, but 30 percent in Great Britain.137 Under such cir-
cumstances, an American investing in Great Britain might easily
wipe out his entire U.S. tax liability even though the lion’s share
of his income was from U.S. sources.
Adams justified a limitation on the FTC to the Senate Fi-
nance Committee as follows:
[The unlimited FTC] is subject to this . . . rather grave abuse: If
the foreign taxes are higher than our rate of taxes, that credit
may wipe out taxes which fairly belong to this country. . . . [W]e
know of instances where big corporations whose income was de-
rived largely from this country have had their tax wiped out, so
far as this country is concerned, because the English tax rates are
three times as high as ours.138
Specifically, Adams requested and Congress enacted what we
now call an “overall limitation”: the amount of FTC available to
any given taxpayer was limited to a proportion of the taxpayer’s
overall U.S. tax liability equal to the proportion of the taxpayer’s
global income derived from foreign sources. For instance, an
American obtaining 10 percent of his income from foreign sources
could use the FTC to offset a maximum of 10% of his total U.S.
tax liability on his worldwide income; the taxpayer would thus
have to bear an increased tax burden for investing in foreign
countries with higher average taxes than the United States. To the
Senate Finance Committee, the case for such a limitation was so
strong that there was no need even to discuss the proposal.139
135. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
136. See WITTE, supra note 40, at 88 (observing that maximum rates on individuals
fell from wartime high of 77% to 24% by the end of the 1920s).
137. See 1921 Hearings, supra note 39, at 74.
138. Id. at 73–74.
139. See id. at 74. The final version of the FTC limitation appears in the Revenue
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The repeal of the U.S. excess profits tax in 1921 made such a limit
even more compelling. Contemporary critics derided the limitless
FTC as an instance of unjustified “prodigality” on the part of the
American government.140
The fundamental purpose of the 1921 foreign tax credit limita-
tion was to protect the ability of the U.S. to collect tax on U.S.
source income, but the limitation on the foreign tax credit also has
had a number of effects on the investment decisions of U.S. resi-
dents. Generally, under such a limitation, if a foreign country’s tax
rate is higher than the U.S. rate, a U.S. investor will prefer a
domestic investment to a foreign investment with an identical pre-
tax rate of return. For an investor who has already made some
foreign investments, however, the limitation’s averaging of foreign
taxes of high-tax and low-tax countries might create advantages for
investments in low-tax countries (to average against the high-tax
foreign country’s taxes as a way of offsetting U.S. tax) or indiffer-
ence about investments in high tax countries (because, due to
investments in low tax countries, the limitation may not be
reached). The limitation enacted in 1921 clearly eliminated the
pure neutrality as between foreign and domestic investments with
the same pre-tax rates of returns that had existed under the unlim-
ited earlier version of the FTC.141
Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 222(a)(5), 42 Stat. 227, 249.
140. See May, supra note 128, at 75.
141. The 1921 Act marked the beginning of tax legislation limiting foreign tax credits.
For example, in 1932 Congress, as part of a general revenue increase, revised the limita-
tion so that taxpayers were required to use the lesser of an overall or per-country limita-
tion. See Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 131(b), 47 Stat. 169, 211. In 1954, the overall
limitation was repealed, leaving only a per-country limitation. See Internal Revenue Code
Act of 1954, ch. 736, § 904, 68A Stat. 3, 287–88 (codified at I.R.C. § 904 (1958)). In
1960, taxpayers were given the option of using an overall or per country limitation. See
Act of Sept. 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86–780, § 1(a), 74 Stat. 1010, 1010 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 904(b) (1964)) (amended 1976). In 1976, the per-country limitation was repealed, and
the law had come full circle to the position of the 1921 Act. See Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94–455, sec. 1031, § 904, 90 Stat. 1610, 1620–24 (codified as amended
at I.R.C. § 904 (1994)). In 1986, a system that categorizes various income into so-called
baskets assumed primacy. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–514, sec. 1201,
§ 904(d), 100 Stat. 2085, 2520–28 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 904 (1994)). Other
“refinements” have also occurred; principally in an effort to ensure that the credit limita-
tion operates to protect U.S. taxation of U.S. source income, as the 1921 Act had origi-
nally intended. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.861–8 (as amended in 1995) (prescribing rules
for the allocation and apportionment of a taxpayer’s deductions in an effort to provide
guidance as to the determination of the taxpayer’s taxable income from specific sources
and activities).
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In addition to capping the FTC, Adams sought also to estab-
lish clear source rules in the 1921 Act. The distinction between
domestic and foreign-source income had become a central organiz-
ing feature of the American international tax system. It required
determining the “U.S. source” income on which foreigners could
be taxed and the “foreign source” income on which Americans
could claim the FTC. The 1918 Act, however, had failed to specify
any rules for determining which income was foreign and which was
domestic source. In the absence of any statutory direction, the
Attorney General had established source rules through written
opinions.142
The Justice Department’s judgment, however, differed from
that of Adams and the Treasury Department on at least two sig-
nificant issues. First, the Attorney General decided that business
income followed sales, regardless of where a product was manufac-
tured or through whose hands it traveled to its final selling point.
According to the Attorney General, who was guided more by
common law traditions than tax policy considerations, only the
nation in which the sale was concluded could levy a tax on income
arising from the sale.143 Adams objected that such a rule denied
the United States authority to tax much income that was, in es-
sence, produced domestically, and that such a rule was open to
taxpayer manipulation:
An English corporation which owns timberland in Arkansas cuts
the trees, roughly fashioning the timber, and cutting them into
rough implement form here, completing the final process of man-
ufacture in Scotland and selling from London, would be held to
derive no part of the profit here. The present law is to this ef-
fect—that a Canadian corporation, for instance, can set up a
factory here, go through all of the business transactions except
final sale, and the income will follow the place of sale.
The danger of all that is that it is possible within limits to
consummate sales wherever you wish. You can conclude the sale
wherever you want to, abroad or here, frequently at your op-
tion.144
142. See 1921 Hearings, supra note 39, at 6, 67.
143. See id. The Attorney General’s opinion is reported at 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 336
(1920).
144. 1921 Hearings, supra note 39, at 6.
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In response to Adams’ argument, Congress transferred discretion
over the allocation of business income to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. The Commissioner was to promulgate regula-
tions apportioning such income between foreign and domestic
sources in a manner more accurately reflecting their relative con-
tributions than the simple sales rule.145
The second major departure from Department of Justice poli-
cy sought by Adams concerned the source rule for interest income.
The Attorney General, again guided by common law, allocated
interest to the residence of the creditor. In contrast, Adams sought
allocation to the residence of the debtor.146 Adams derived this
rule from the practices of the American states with their income
taxes.147 The rule Adams preferred not only would strengthen
source-based taxation, but also would reassure American lenders in
Europe that the European taxes on their interest income would be
credited against their U.S. tax liability. Adams reported to the
Congress the “very active interest” of the Departments of State
and Commerce in the provision, suggesting that the channeling of
private capital to Europe was at least one motivation for the re-
form.148 The interest source rule advanced by Adams was accept-
ed by Congress.149
145. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 217(e), 42 Stat. 227, 243–45. More specifi-
cally, Congress empowered the Commissioner to develop “processes or formulas of gener-
al apportionment” with respect to income derived from sources “partly within and partly
without the United States,” a category of income expressly including income arising from
the manufacture of goods in one country and the sale in another. Id. This preference for
formulary apportionment may reflect a longstanding interest of Adams. Indeed, this meth-
od of apportionment had been pioneered by Adams’ Wisconsin income tax, and would
become the norm in state taxation. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 30, at
628–31. Nonetheless, § 217(e) offered a different mechanism for the allocation of income
arising from the purchase of goods in one country and the resale in another; in such cas-
es, the “source” of the income would be “the country in which [the goods were] sold.”
Revenue Act of 1921 § 217(e). In interpreting this ambiguous standard, courts ultimately
looked to commercial law principles relating to passage of title. See Choate et al., supra
note 23, at 450.
This issue remains both important and difficult today. See, e.g., TREASURY SALES
SOURCE REPORT TO CONGRESS (1992). The Clinton Administration proposed in its bud-
get for fiscal year 1998 a revision to the sales source rules that would allocate income
from products manufactured in the U.S. and sold abroad based on “actual economic
activity.” The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 1998, submitted to Congress Feb. 6,
1997, Analytical Perspectives, at 52.
146. See 1921 Hearings, supra note 39, at 66–67.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 68.
149. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 217(a), 42 Stat. 227, 243–44. As with inter-
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Though the interest and business income rules represented the
most significant departures from existing practices (as established
by the Attorney General), Adams offered Congress a full range of
source rules, governing income from real property, intellectual
property, personal services, and dividends. Adams assured Con-
gress that these rules were derived from existing domestic and
international practices, and reassured the Senate Finance Com-
mittee that the source rules were the most thoroughly researched
provision of the 1921 Act.150 As a result, Congress enacted an
extensive set of detailed source rules in the 1921 Act, specifically
covering interest, dividends, rents and royalties from real, personal
and intangible property, personal services, gains from the sale of
real and personal property and the manufacture and sale of per-
sonal property.151 Adams’ views concerning the need for explicit
and clear source rules and about the proper rules, as reflected by
the 1921 Act, would also play a significant part in his subsequent
efforts to shape the source rules of a model international income
tax treaty.152
C. The Foreign Traders and Possessions Corporations Provisions
of the 1921 Act—Exempting Foreign Source Income
The FTC mechanism, enacted in the 1918 Act and refined in
the 1921 legislation, effectively gave priority to source-based taxa-
tion, while retaining residence-based taxation as a backstop.153
The residence-based safeguard was generally relevant only to tax-
payers who had income from foreign tax havens or who otherwise
managed to dodge foreign taxes on their foreign-source income.
This safeguard worked reasonably well for non-business income,
but by 1921, certain problems had emerged in the treatment of
est, the 1921 Act sourced dividends based on the residence of the payor. Rental and roy-
alty income from tangible property was sourced to where the property was situated, while
income from intellectual property was sourced to where used. See id. These source rules
have largely remained intact to the present day. See I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(4), 862(a)(4) (1994).
150. See 1921 Hearings, supra note 39, at 67.
151. See Revenue Act of 1921, § 217, 42 Stat. 243–45.
152. See infra notes 251–55 and accompanying text.
153. Unlike most countries, the U.S. taxes U.S. residents and non-resident citizens
alike, so the FTC was also a backstop for citizenship-based taxation. To avoid cumber-
some repetition of the phrase “residents and citizens,” however, we have lumped together
the United States’ citizenship-based and residence-based tax jurisdiction under the term
“residence-based.”
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business income.154 Businesses that derived much income from
jurisdictions with low income taxes had a tax incentive to trade in
their American charters, reincorporate in a foreign jurisdiction, and
thereby avoid American taxes.155
Even in the early days of income taxation, experience was
proving that the corporate form could and would be easily manip-
ulated in order to escape residence-based taxation. In the 1920s,
such manipulation not only circumvented the residence backstop,
but also was considered a threat to American prestige and eco-
nomic power; many successful American businesses abroad might
ultimately be transformed into foreign enterprises. Moreover, those
American businesses that remained incorporated in the United
States claimed they were being handicapped in competition with
foreign firms from countries that exempted all foreign source in-
come from any domestic taxation.156
Adams also was concerned with the potential for related cor-
porations to manipulate intercompany prices to reduce their com-
bined tax burdens. Adams described such concerns during the
hearings on the 1921 Act in urging a provision to give the Bureau
of Internal Revenue the authority to consolidate the returns of
affiliated corporations for the purpose of properly apportioning
profits. This was the precursor to the still-controversial modern
“Arm’s Length Standard,” under which transactions between relat-
ed entities can be adjusted by the IRS if it finds that the
taxpayer’s accounting does not produce transfer prices that are in
accord with the prices that would have been selected by parties
dealing at arm’s length.157 Adams said:
At the present time it is possible—and I am afraid the device is
being used increasingly—to incorporate a subsidiary and throw
154. The residence backstop, for instance, discouraged Americans from investing in
tax-exempt bonds issued by foreign governments—a tax dodge that was a particular bo-
gey man for Adams and the Treasury Department in the 1920s. See infra note 307.
155. Businesses in high-income-tax jurisdictions had less of a temptation to reincorpo-
rate abroad because their foreign taxes could more fully offset American taxes through
the FTC. Thus, the foreign-source income of such businesses was more-or-less effectively
exempt from American taxes. By contrast, American businesses in a nation such as Chi-
na, which did not have an income tax, were fully liable to the United States for their
foreign-source income. Given that nations without an income tax might still levy a range
of sales taxes, property taxes, and registration fees, American businesses in such nations
might still regard themselves as facing substantial taxation.
156. See 1921 Hearings, supra note 39, at 7.
157. See I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
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the profits one way or the other. If that subsidiary is a foreign
corporation you can throw the profits to it: in other words, by
selling products to it at artificially high prices.158
Adams responded to both of these concerns by proposing to
lift the residence backstop of the foreign tax credit from a particu-
lar class of taxpayers, which he dubbed “foreign traders” and
“foreign trade corporations.”159 These taxpayers would be “taxed
substantially as foreign corporations and foreign nonresidents”—in
other words, taxed only on their U.S.-source income.160 In order
to qualify for this exemption of foreign source income, a taxpayer
would need to show that its income was derived primarily from
the active conduct of business abroad: at least 80 percent of the
taxpayer’s income over the past three years had to come from
foreign sources, and at least 50 percent from the active conduct of
business.161
Recognizing a distinction between active business income and
passive income, which permeates international taxation today,
Adams expressly excluded passive investment abroad from the
foreign trader provision.162 The restrictions requiring active busi-
ness income were “put in there to prevent, for instance, persons
living over here investing in French or Danish or Swiss bonds and
getting a large percentage of income from that and claiming ex-
emption. . . . The thing would be open to abuse if some such
condition[s] were not imposed.”163 Adams intended to lift the
residence backstop only in those cases in which he thought it was
unhelpful because easily evaded and perhaps detrimental to U.S.
economic interests.164
158. 1921 Hearings, supra note 39, at 80.
159. Id. at 6.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 7.
162. Further legislation dealing with this problem was adopted in 1937 and the Code
today contains a complex array of provisions addressing the treatment of such passive
income. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a), 904(d)(2)(a) (1994). For further discussion
of the treatment of passive income in international tax, see, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note
8, at 1305–10.
163. 1921 Hearings, supra note 39, at 7.
164. In part, Adams probably felt comfortable making the foreign trader proposal
because of the other reforms contained in the 1921 Act. The trader provision created a
risk that American firms with trader subsidiaries would juggle their accounting so as to
shift as much income as possible to the subsidiaries, which were free from U.S. resi-
dence-based taxes. However, the Internal Revenue Bureau’s new authority to look
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The House and the Senate Finance Committee agreed to
Adams’ proposal.165 The Senate Report argued:
Under existing law an American citizen or domestic corporation
is taxed upon his or its entire income, even though all of it is de-
rived from business transacted without the United States. This
results in double taxation, places American business concerns at
a serious disadvantage in the competitive struggle for foreign
trade, encourages American corporations doing business in for-
eign countries to surrender their American charters and incorpo-
rate under the laws of foreign countries, results in serious admin-
istrative difficulties with respect to the collection of taxes due
from individuals resident in foreign countries, and encourages
American citizens to expatriate themselves. In order to remedy
this situation foreign traders and foreign trade corporations . . .
will be taxed under this act substantially as nonresidents
. . . .166
On the Senate floor, however, the Progressive Senator
LaFollette led a successful attack on the provision, arguing that it
represented an inequitable tax break for the wealthy and would
encourage the flight of capital and jobs abroad.167 As the debate
progressed, two facts emerged: 1) few nations at that time exempt-
ed the foreign-source income of residents, suggesting that Ameri-
cans were in fact not routinely handicapped by U.S. residence-
based taxation in competition with companies from abroad;168
and 2) as a practical matter, the problems associated with the resi-
dence backstop then were of great economic import only in the
through corporate accounting practices to the substance of transactions (the proto-Arm’s
Length Standard authority) provided hope that such tax avoidance could be effectively
countered. The language of the proposed Arm’s Length standard provision expressly cov-
ered foreign trade corporations. See id. at 80; see also supra note 157 and accompanying
text.
165. See Magill & Schaab, supra note 106, at 123.
166. S. REP. NO. 67–275, at 9 (1921), reprinted in 95A INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1909–1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DOCUMENTS (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979).
167. See Magill & Schaab, supra note 106, at 123. Joining Senator LaFollette, Senator
Simmons argued that the provision “came from sources ‘profoundly interested in advanc-
ing the interests of consolidated, coordinated, combined, and predatory wealth.’” Roy G.
Blakey, The Revenue Act of 1921, 12 AM. ECON. REV. 75, 96 (1922) (quoting 61 CONG.
REC. 8994 (1921)).
168. U.S. residence-based taxation disadvantaged a U.S. corporation in competition
with a company resident in a low-tax jurisdiction for business in that jurisdiction, but it
did not disadvantage a U.S. company in competition with companies from a third country
that itself did not exempt foreign source income.
FILE:C:\WP51\DLJ\GRAETZ.PP Dec 12/06/97 Sat 10:51am
1997] ORIGINAL INTENT 1063
Philippines.169 In the end, Congress adopted a compromise mea-
sure: the “foreign trader” provision was transformed into a special
exemption for businesses operating in U.S. possessions. Only tax-
payers who obtained at least 80 percent of their income from U.S.
possessions (including the Philippines), and at least 50 percent
from the active conduct of business, were eligible for an exemp-
tion of income.170
Economists today regard a system that exempts foreign source
income from tax in the residence country as furthering “capital
import neutrality.”171 The typical example to make this point is
an investment by a U.S. company in a low-tax jurisdiction. A
169. See Magill & Schaab, supra note 106, at 124.
170. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 262, 42 Stat. 227, 271. Notwithstanding
Senator LaFollette’s belief that rejection of the “foreign trader” proposal would help
keep American capital at home, Congress seems to have been well aware that the
LaFollette Amendment would simply encourage American firms to incorporate subsid-
iaries abroad—capital would continue to flow overseas, but through a corporate form
shielding the returns from current U.S. residence-based taxation. Accordingly, the Confer-
ence Committee introduced a number of measures into the 1921 Act that provided com-
petitive advantages to American firms with foreign subsidiaries. For example, Congress
made clear that interest and dividend income paid by corporations that derived 80% of
their gross income from foreign sources would be treated as foreign-source income. See
Revenue Act of 1921 § 217(a)(1)-(2). We have not been able to ascertain what role, if
any, Adams played in the development of these provisions. Note that they respond to
one of the concerns the “foreign trader” provision was intended to address (competitive-
ness of American firms abroad), while acquiescing to the incorporation of American busi-
ness enterprises abroad. Though the “foreign trader” provision was not originally intend-
ed to promote trade and investment in any particular region, its transformation into the
Possessions Corporation provision pointed to a later theme in U.S. international tax poli-
cy: the provision of tax benefits to encourage economic development in favored regions.
Thus, in 1939 Congress implemented a new law quite similar in structure to the Posses-
sions Corporation provision, but designed to benefit Western Hemisphere Trade Corpora-
tions. See Terence M. Flynn, Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations: Quo Vadis?, 12
TAX L. REV. 413, 414 (1957). In 1922, Congress passed the China Trade Act (CTA),
which provided relief to China Trade Corporations, albeit through a complicated structure
dissimilar to that governing Possessions Corporations. See id. Notwithstanding the dissimi-
lar relief mechanism, the CTA grew in part out of concerns similar to those motivating
the “foreign trader” proposal: In China, as in the Philippines, the FTC was inadequate to
place American firms on an equal tax footing with important foreign competitors. See
generally Jennifer Hunt, China Trade Act (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors). Indeed, the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings on the China
problem prior to its hearings on the 1921 Act. Adams did not testify on the subject in
1920 or later, and appears never to have articulated a position on the CTA, or, more
generally, on such regionally-focused tax relief measures.
171. See Frisch, supra note 85, at 584; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 1312 n.42;
Ault & Bradford, supra note 21, at 39 (pointing out that capital import neutrality “ob-
tains when there is no tax-based difference in circumstances at firms operating within a
given country associated with the nationality of the firm’s owners”).
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foreign tax credit system is designed to tax the U.S. resident on its
foreign source income at a rate equal to the excess of the U.S.
rate over the foreign rate. This is all the relief necessary to elimi-
nate double taxation (and, it is said today, to make the U.S. inves-
tor indifferent about investing here or abroad). This, however,
could create a disadvantage for U.S. multinationals in competition
with investors who reside in countries that exempt foreign-source
income of their residents. These investors will only owe the low-
rate tax imposed by the source country. France, Germany, the
Netherlands and Canada are among the countries who are regard-
ed as having such exemption or “territorial” systems.172 This con-
cern with international competitiveness motivated the 1921 “for-
eign trader” proposal, as today it spurs calls for moving to an
exemption for foreign source income.173 Policymakers’ attitudes
toward these arguments often depend on whether they are focus-
ing on a choice by a U.S. resident to invest here or abroad, in
which case they worry about favoring foreign investment, or, on
the other hand, are focusing on whether an investment abroad will
be made by a U.S. or foreign firm, in which case they worry about
the international competitiveness of the U.S. firm.
But the distinction between exemption and foreign tax credit
systems tends to be overdrawn. First, many countries that have an
exemption system exempt foreign source income only if taxed
“comparably” abroad.174 In addition, many countries—with
France being a notable exception—have a so-called exemption with
progression, and take the exempt income into account in determin-
ing the applicable tax in a progressive rate structure.175
Moreover, the U.S. system has important elements of a regime
designed to promote capital import neutrality. The averaging
across countries inherent in an “overall” limitation on the foreign
tax credit often makes it advantageous for a company that already
has investments in a jurisdiction with tax rates higher than the
U.S. to invest in foreign jurisdiction with a lower tax rate. In addi-
tion, if an investment abroad is made by a foreign subsidiary of a
U.S. parent, no U.S. tax is imposed until the earnings of the sub-
172. See AULT ET AL., supra note 13, at 402–08.
173. See HUFBAUER, supra note 12, at 57–60 (discussing the implications of a policy
of capital import neutrality on international competitiveness).
174. See Ault & Bradford, supra note 21, at 24–28.
175. See id.
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sidiary are repatriated as dividends to the parent. When that hap-
pens, the U.S. allows a credit for the taxes paid to the foreign
government.176 If the tax rate of the foreign country is low or
the deferral of U.S. tax is sufficiently lengthy, the present value of
the U.S. tax can be very close to zero—an exemption. In addition,
by timing the payment of dividends from foreign subsidiaries, U.S.
parents can minimize the impact of the FTC limitation.177 Thus,
a recent survey of countries’ different systems concluded: “While
the exemption technique is often contrasted with the credit ap-
proach, in actual operation the two methods of relieving double
taxation often yield quite similar results.”178
Adams’ attempt to effect a significant departure from a credit
system in favor of an exemption system had only limited success.
His 1921 foreign trader proposal does, however, offer further evi-
dence of the primacy Adams accorded source-based taxation of
business income. Indeed, Adams felt that jurisdiction over business
taxation was by nature source-based, while jurisdiction over per-
sonal income could be residence-based: “The personal income tax
is laid upon the individual in his capacity of consumer, and is paid
where he resides; whereas the business income tax is paid by men
in their productive or commercial capacity at the place where the
income is earned.”179 After 1921, Adams remained committed to
the foreign tax credit mechanism as a residence backstop, particu-
larly for capturing tax from U.S. residents on foreign-source in-
come not taxed abroad. Adams apparently never revived his “for-
eign trader” proposal. Indeed, the 1921 Act was Adams’ last as
chief spokesperson for the Treasury Department and with passage
of the 1921 Act, Adams’ work on international taxation shifted
from domestic legislation to international agreements.180
176. See I.R.C. § 902 (1994). This is the modern version of § 240(c) of the Revenue
Act of 1918.
177. See, e.g., JAMES R. HINES, JR., TAX POLICY AND THE ACTIVITIES OF MULTINA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS 31 (NBER Working Paper No. 5589, 1996) (stating that firms
have incentives “to reduce their tax liabilities through selective repatriations”).
178. AULT ET AL., supra note 13, at 381.
179. Adams, Taxation of Business, supra note 58, at 193.
180. See Fairchild, supra note 42, at 10.
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IV. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MODEL INCOME TAX TREATY
A. The Beginning of the Tax Treaty Process: The International
Chamber of Commerce
Many present-day scholars have noticed that the modern
OECD model tax treaty is a direct descendant of the League of
Nations model treaty developed in the mid–1920s, and some have
recognized roots of the League effort in earlier work by the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce.181 Newly organized in 1920, the
International Chamber—an umbrella organization with ties to
national chambers of commerce in many nations, including the
United States—placed double taxation on the international diplo-
matic agenda and formulated an influential early approach to the
problem. T.S. Adams, a member of the International Chamber’s
Double Taxation Committee, played an important role in the
Chamber’s effort. This prologue to the League’s 1928 model treaty
advanced resolution of many issues the League would grapple with
and also sheds light on the priorities and assumptions subsequently
carried by Adams to his position as U.S. representative to the
League.182
The International Chamber adopted a resolution at its organi-
zational meeting in Paris in 1920, calling for “prompt agreement
between the Governments of the Allied countries in order to
prevent individuals or companies from being compelled to pay a
tax on the same income in more than one country.”183 Given the
181. See Ault, supra note 16, at 567–68 (stating the “ultimate result” of the League of
Nations work on bilateral tax treaties was the OECD Model Treaty); see also
Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 82, at 365–66 (observing that the League’s choice of
“‘classification and assignment’” as the basic structure for bilateral tax agreements is used
today in “virtually all tax treaties”). Although the role of the International Chamber has
been neglected somewhat in recent scholarship, older accounts of the history of the tax
treaty movement usually begin with the Chamber. See, e.g., HERNDON, supra note 103, at
19–40; Carroll, supra note 109, at 696 (noting the International Chamber’s appeal to the
League of Nations at the close of World War I to prevent double taxation).
182. The Chamber materials may be particularly instructive about Adams’ approach to
international treaty–making, because he was involved with the Chamber’s effort almost
from its outset. On the other hand, by the time Adams joined the League’s double taxa-
tion project, the League had already produced a draft treaty and was invested in a par-
ticular approach to the double taxation problem. Thus, Adams’ role within the League
was somewhat more limited than his role in the Chamber’s effort.
183. HERNDON, supra note 103, at 20 (quoting Organizational Meeting of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce Res. 11 (June 28, 1919) INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE).
Several American delegates were apparently quite active in fashioning this resolution. See
Memorandum No. 2: A Statement Upon the Attention That Has Been Given to the
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key American presence, the 1920 resolution, to no one’s surprise,
envisioned an American-style solution to the double tax problem:
taxation by both residence and source with residence deferring to
source, while retaining a “right to claim the difference between the
[source country] tax paid and the home tax.”184
A year later, the International Chamber took up more de-
tailed resolutions concerning double taxation.185 Contrary to the
American position, these resolutions distinguished the progressive
and non-progressive elements of an income tax (or “super” and
“normal” taxes), suggesting that the former should be levied based
solely on citizenship, while the latter should be levied based on
the place where income was “earned and collected.”186 Nations
levying normal taxes were to exempt foreign-source income, or at
least provide a credit for normal taxes paid abroad. Under this ap-
proach, taxing jurisdiction would turn on the nature of the tax in
question—as we will see, an idea that reappears in the League ef-
fort.187
Subject of Double Taxation in International Chamber Circles to Date 5 (undated and
unsigned, but probably prepared for Adams in 1922 by John O’Connor, an official of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and secretary of the double taxation committee) (available
in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, Box 12, 1921–23 folder) [hereinafter 1922 Cham-
ber Memo].
184. HERNDON, supra note 103, at 20 (quoting Resolution Number 11).
185. These resolutions were drafted by a committee comprised of representatives from
the national chambers of commerce of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Nether-
lands, and the United States. See id. at 21.
Between the 1920 and 1921 International Chamber meetings, the 1920 International
Financial Conference in Brussels had taken up the call for international action to prevent
double taxation. The Financial Conference was particularly concerned with the effect of
double taxation on the ability of investors to make foreign investments, and specifically
requested the League of Nations to take up the issue. See id. at 41–42.
186. Id. at 21–22. The distinction between progressive and non-progressive elements of
an income tax may be less clear today than in 1921. The early American income taxes
included both a “normal” tax, a flat tax applicable to all taxpayers, and a graduated
surtax on high incomes. See WITTE, supra note 40, at 76–86. Under the 1921 resolutions,
then, the United States would only levy its surtaxes on citizens—irrespective of residence
or source of income—and its normal tax on domestic-source income. Schedular taxes,
levies of varying rates—commonly used by European nations—on specific sources of
income, were treated as “normal” taxes under this scheme.
187. In preparation for the 1921 meeting, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce consulted
with Adams about the resolutions. Adams found the normal/super tax distinction to be
“equitable and fundamentally in accord with sound theory,” but suggested a number of
modifications: 1) “where collected” should not be the basis for allocating income because
it is easily manipulable; 2) source rules must be carefully worked out prior to submitting
a plan to national legislatures; 3) because the surtaxes were so much heavier and more
important in America than the normal taxes, it was inappropriate not to take source into
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The 1921 resolutions also required nondiscrimination among
residents, citizens, and foreigners. This nondiscrimination require-
ment has become a fundamental principle of tax treaties.188 It is
essentially a requirement that a country where income is sourced
must not tax such income in a manner that discriminates against
foreigners.189
After the International Chamber adopted the 1921 resolutions,
the scheme was referred to the national chambers of commerce for
suggestions for implementation. The U.S. Chamber asked Adams
to head a special subcommittee on the subject.190 Adams urged
the International Chamber to endorse unilateral domestic legis-
lation along the lines of the American FTC, to canvass the double
taxation committees of the various national chambers of commerce
for concrete examples of international double taxation, and to
develop proposals for specific source rules to overcome the
problems.191 In 1922, Adams convened a meeting of the U.S.
Committee to discuss specific reform proposals.192 The Americans
account in figuring the surtaxes, particularly with respect to American corporations doing
most of their business abroad; and 4) super taxes should be levied not just on citizens,
but also on resident aliens. See 1922 Chamber Memo, supra note 183, at 9–10. Adams’
first three suggestions seem to flow out of problems with the U.S. domestic legislation,
which Adams was also working on in 1921. Note that, as usual, Adams assumes source
should be the ultimate basis of jurisdiction for the most important taxes.
188. See OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention on Income and
Capital, art. 24, cl. 5, Sept. 1, 1992, reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) ¶ 191 [hereinafter
OECD Model Treaty.] For additional examples of nondiscrimination provisions in interna-
tional tax treaties, see KEES VAN RAAD, NONDISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX
LAW 76–123 (1986) (studying nondiscrimination clauses under United States, Netherlands,
and OECD Model Convention tax treaties).
189. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Alternatives for International Corporate Tax Reform, 49
TAX L. REV. 599, 600 (1994).
190. See 1922 Chamber Memo, supra note 183, at 12. The members of the U.S. Com-
mittee were: Thomas S. Adams; Robert Grant, Jr. (Higginson & Co., London); W.F.
Gephart (Vice President, First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis); Jerome D. Greene (Lee,
Higginson & Co., New York); and John J. O’Connor (Manager, Finance Dep’t, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce). See id.
191. See Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on Double Taxation of the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce 4 (Mar. 1, 1922) (available in T.S. Adams Papers,
Yale University, Box 12, 1921–1923 folder).
192. The U.S. Committee could not produce a list of concrete examples of double
taxation and concluded that American companies, in fact, were subject to double taxation
only quite rarely. See American Section of the International Chamber of Commerce Dou-
ble Taxation Committee, Memorandum to Accompany Minutes of Meeting on Double
Taxation (May 23, 1922) (available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, Box 12,
1921–1923 folder) [hereinafter American Section Memo]. In this regard, members of the
Committee noted that the foreign tax credit was a “lifesaver” for American firms. See id.
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decided not to adhere to the normal/super tax distinction of the
1921 resolutions. Rather, Adams’ committee endorsed the follow-
ing suggestions: 1) an American-style foreign tax credit; 2) income
of shipping companies should be sourced to the nation of registry
of the ship or to the nation in which “effective control” of the
company was exercised; and 3) income from sales of manufactured
goods abroad should be apportioned “by some fair and reasonable
method” between the nation of manufacture and the nation of
sale.193 This was vintage Adams: the U.S. Committee rejected
carving out a particular type of tax (here, the super tax) for exclu-
sive citizenship or residence-based jurisdiction, preferring to rely
on a foreign tax credit as a means of collecting residual residence-
based taxation. The Committee regarded source-based taxation as
primary, and it focused most of its efforts on incremental improve-
ments to source rules.
The International Chamber synthesized the responses of the
various national committees, and sent a resulting set of fifteen
resolutions back to the national committees for comment.194
These resolutions, slated for discussion and voting at the Interna-
tional Chamber’s 1923 Congress in Rome, were to become the
blueprint in many respects for all subsequent model treaty propos-
als (though the resolutions themselves were not in the form of a
model treaty and in fact were not ultimately adopted by the Rome
Congress principally due to opposition from the British). In partic-
ular, the Rome Resolutions incorporated a classification and as-
The Committee also noted that other nations routinely failed to enforce certain taxes
against foreign companies, and that many taxes that were enforced were easy to evade
by use of certain organizational structures. See id.
193. The Committee preferred the tax credit over an exemption for reasons of
progressivity and for concerns over some income escaping taxation altogether. See Amer-
ican Section Report, supra note 77, at 1–3. The shipping tax suggestion represented a
very narrow, incremental reform. See id. at 2–3. The U.S. Committee conceded that theo-
ry did not dictate the registry/effective control rule, but argued that “[i]t is more impor-
tant to secure the adoption of one uniform rule than to insist that an exactly correct
theoretical rule be developed.” Id. at 3.
194. These resolutions included the foreign tax credit, but not the shipping or sales
apportionment suggestions of the U.S. Committee. For a list of the resolutions with a
point-by-point summary of the American and British responses, see Committee on Dou-
ble Taxation of the International Chamber of Commerce, Observations of the American
and British National Committees with Regard to Resolutions Presented at the Rome
Congress by the International Chamber’s Select Committee on Double Taxation (Aug. 29,
1923) (available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, Box 12, 1923–1924 folder) [here-
inafter Observations].
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signment system for various categories of income (e.g., income
from real estate to the nation where located, income from business
divided among source nations according to the relative contribu-
tions of each).195 The Rome Resolutions further foreshadowed
the core principles of later model treaties by crystallizing the com-
peting theories of taxation at residence and source (discarding the
notion of citizenship), reaffirming the ideal of nondiscrimination
between foreigners and residents, and proposing the allocation of
business profits between source nations by some objective mecha-
nism.196 A witness to the later League of Nations meetings on
double taxation observed that the Rome Resolutions set forth for
the first time “a clear statement of the problem” and that it was
with the terminology of the Rome Resolutions “that the battles of
the [League] experts were waged in 1927 and 1928.”197 He added
that while “no group of experts has accepted all these principles
[of the Rome Resolutions] as sound . . . they have been used as
the firm basis on which draft conventions have been built or actu-
al treaties adopted.”198
The 1923 Rome Resolutions by the International Chamber
hedged on the allocation rules for interest and dividends, stating
that these categories of income could be taxed by the nations of
either payor or payee.199 This, too, was an omen of things to
come; a few years later, interest and dividend income would be-
come the most contentious items in negotiations over the League’s
model treaty.
195. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at 25–26. “Perhaps the most significant aspect of
the League’s work [on double taxation in the 1920s] was its ultimate choice of ‘classifica-
tion and assignment’ as the basic structure for a model bilateral agreement. This structure
is used today in virtually all tax treaties.” Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 82, at
366 (footnote omitted). The choice was perhaps “significant,” but by no means innova-
tive. The Rome Resolutions and the source rules of the American Revenue Act of 1921
employed classification and assignment before the structure made its first appearance in a
League report in 1923. For additional discussion of the 1923 Report, see infra notes
215–28 and accompanying text. The International Chamber was in close contact with the
League on the double taxation issue throughout the 1920s, and the League was no doubt
well aware of the structure of the Rome Resolutions. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at
24–25.
196. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at 24–25.
197. Id. at 28.
198. Id. The Rome Resolutions also envisioned a credit mechanism which would allow
nations of residence to levy taxes on worldwide income at whatever rate or rates they
choose, but only after an offset for taxes paid abroad on foreign-source income. See id.
199. See id.
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Adams and the U.S. Committee generally approved the sub-
stance of the Rome Resolutions, but objected somewhat to the
form. Specifically, the Americans opposed the systematic, ex ante
allocation of all types of income to one jurisdiction or another; the
Americans preferred more limited reforms tailored to address
specific, concrete instances of double taxation.200 Adams sensed
that the Rome Resolutions would generate much controversy over
the relative claims of countries of residence and source, and felt
that the International Chamber should focus on generating con-
sensus behind allocation rules that everyone could agree on.201 If
forced to take a position on the interest/dividend issue, however,
the Americans came down on the side of the claim of the payor’s
country, i.e., taxation by source rather than residence.202 Other-
wise, the U.S. Committee generally approved the resolutions.203
In contrast, the British Committee vociferously opposed these
resolutions. Its overriding objection was to the resolutions’ empha-
sis on source-based taxation. The British argued that all taxation
should be residence-based, mirroring the British system. The Brit-
ish, for example, opposed the Americans on interest and dividends,
calling for taxation exclusively by the recipient nation.204
The British also made concrete their preference for residence-
based taxation by writing their preference into a 1926 bilateral tax
treaty with the new Irish Free State, which exempted nonresidents
200. See American Suggestions, supra note 56, at 1–2.
201.
The American Committee entertains grave doubt whether real progress is likely
to be made by an attempt to adopt abstract principles . . . . [T]here are, not
one, but many principles or bases of taxation which are theoretically valid. . . .
[D]ouble taxation can be . . . reduced to a minimum not by discussions of ab-
stract principles, but by adopting . . . ‘a few definite proposals of a compara-
tively restricted scope . . . .’
Id. at 1 (citations omitted).
202. See id. at 3. The American Committee arrived at this decision both as a matter
of “principle” and “administrative convenience.” Id.
203. Notwithstanding its general approval of the Rome Resolutions, the American
Committee proposed technical modifications of some provisions and, for political reasons,
suggested the complete removal of a provision creating an international board of appeal
for tax issues. See id. at 5 (“The American Committee regretfully expresses its belief that
there is no hope that the American federal or state governments would in any way per-
mit their decision of actual tax cases to be affected by an international organiza-
tion . . . .”). This sentiment has contemporary echoes in current debates over U.S. sub-
mission to the jurisdiction of international trade tribunals. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, U.S.
Rejects Role for World Court in Trade Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at A1.
204. See Observations, supra note 194, at 2–3.
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from taxation.205 With the exception of this treaty, consummated
with a dependant partner with little room to maneuver, the United
Kingdom did not sign any comprehensive tax treaty until its 1945
treaty with the United States. It took that long for Britain to
compromise its preference for residence-based taxation. That year
Britain also first introduced a foreign tax credit applicable to na-
tions outside the Commonwealth.206
In addition to its apparently principled view that taxation
should be imposed by the country of residence, residence-based
taxation was beneficial to the British fisc as a net exporter of
capital. The fact that the United States, also a net capital exporter
at that time, took a contrary position may be explained by a vari-
ety of factors: Adams’ preference for source-based taxation as an
appropriate means of implementing the benefit principle of taxa-
tion and administrative advantages; Adams’ desire to avoid antago-
nizing debtor nations, who comprised the bulk of International
Chamber members and whose support would be necessary to forge
a successful international agreement; and the international balance
of payments, which was overwhelmingly in the United States’ favor
and which permitted (perhaps even, in the interests of providing
dollars for the purchase of U.S. exports and for the payment of
U.S.-held debts, required) generosity in source rules to capital
importers. Source-based taxation also represented a less significant
departure from prevailing practices under the United States’ tax
law than in Great Britain—thanks in substantial part to Adams’
work.
Thus, the battle lines were drawn, with the capital-exporting
British rejecting any semblance of source-based taxation, and the
capital-importing debtor nations of continental Europe, principally
France and Italy, defending source-based taxation, along with the
United States which, however, was expressing skepticism about the
general direction of the International Chamber’s project and cer-
tain specific provisions. Caught in this crossfire, the Resolutions
failed to be accepted at the Rome Congress, and were referred
back to the International Double Taxation Committee for further
development.207
205. See May, supra note 128, at 74.
206. See Vital, supra note 7, at 6.
207. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at 28–29.
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In response to the issues raised by the American and British
national committees, the International Committee proposed a
compromise in November, 1923: the International Chamber would
endorse the principle that in the long run all taxation should be
residence-based, but, in the short run, nations should work toward
developing bilateral treaties implementing the American-style for-
eign tax credit.208 However, the U.S. and other national commit-
tees (notably the Italians) maintained their opposition to even this
formulation of residence-based taxation.209 The Americans contin-
ued their call for a more incremental, less theory-oriented ap-
proach to reform. The U.S. Committee argued that no progress
would be made so long as the International Committee was in the
business of trying to decide between residence and source-based
taxation. The Americans asserted that the theoretical claims of
both sides were valid and that, in any event, few nations could
afford to give up entirely one of the two classes of taxes.
Prior to the 1923 Rome Congress, and arguably until 1925, the
International Chamber exercised primary leadership in the move-
ment against international double taxation. As we discuss in detail
in the next section, in 1923 a committee of economists appointed
by the League of Nations issued a major study of double taxa-
tion.210 This report established a foothold in the international tax
field for the League, but the Economists’ 1923 Report did not
exert a discernible influence on the International Chamber effort.
The following two years continued the impasse in the Chamber’s
work. The body could not reconcile the varying agendas of the
British, the Americans, and the continental allies.
During that time, the League of Nations appointed a commit-
tee of “technical experts,” who were representatives of seven Eu-
ropean governments, to study the double taxation problem.211 In
1925, these experts produced a new report, less theoretical and
208. See International Chamber of Commerce, Resolutions Unanimously Adopted by
the Committee on Double Taxation 1–2 (Nov. 24, 1923) (available in T.S. Adams Papers,
Yale University, Box 12, 1923–1924 folder).
209. See Annual Report of the American Committee on Double Taxation (c. 1924)
(available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, Box 12, 1923–1924 folder). For a dis-
cussion of the Italian position, see HERNDON, supra note 103, at 33–34.
210. See infra note 215.
211. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at 57. Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Great
Britain, Italy, Netherlands, and Switzerland were the original countries represented. See
id. at 58.
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more favorable to source-based taxation than the 1923 Report.212
Given the impasse in its own effort, the Chamber—with Adams’
support—endorsed the 1925 Report.213 After this endorsement,
the League assumed a clear leadership position. The Chamber re-
mained active, primarily through its representatives to the League’s
Committee of Technical Experts, but from then on the resolutions
of its annual congresses largely functioned as endorsements of the
League’s work, rather than exercises of innovation and influ-
ence.214
B. The Torch Passes to the League of Nations
As we noted, the League of Nations fired its opening salvo on
double taxation with the widely noted 1923 Report by the “four
economists”: Professor Edwin R.A. Seligman of the United States,
Sir Josiah Stamp of Great Britain, Professor G.W.J. Bruins of the
Netherlands, and Professor Luigi Einaudi of Italy.215 Seligman,
212. See Report and Resolutions Submitted by the Technical Experts on Double Taxa-
tion and Tax Evasion to the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, League of
Nations Doc. No. C.115 M.55 1925 II (1925) [hereinafter 1925 Report]. For further dis-
cussion of the 1925 Report, see infra notes 229–35 and accompanying text.
213. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at 36–37 (quoting resolutions of 1925 Brussels
Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce). Adams’ position on the 1925
Report is discussed infra note 236 and accompanying text.
214. For a discussion of the post–1925 work of the International Chamber on double
taxation, see HERNDON, supra note 103, at 38–40.
215. Seligman and Stamp initiated a correspondence on the project in the fall of 1921,
before it was even clear who the other members of committee would be. See Letter from
Stamp to Seligman (Oct. 31, 1921) (E.R.A. Seligman Papers, Columbia University, Box
44, League of Nations folder). The two exchanged five lengthy “notes” which essentially
became the first, and less important, half of the 1923 Report, dealing with the “burdens
and barriers” caused by double taxation. All of these notes are contained in E.R.A.
Seligman Papers, Columbia University, Box 44, League of Nations folder. In the last of
these notes, Seligman proposed the personal/impersonal distinction and the allocational
mechanism of economic allegiance which, as we will see, became the foundation for the
second part of the 1923 Report, recommending solutions for the problem of double taxa-
tion. See E.R.A. Seligman, Note on Sir Josiah Stamp’s Note Transmitted on June 1st,
1922, at 6–8 (June 22, 1922) (E.R.A. Seligman Papers, Columbia University, Box 44,
League of Nations folder).
Professor Bruins did not weigh in with substantive comments until March 8, 1923,
and then largely endorsed the approach sketched out by Seligman’s note. See G.W.J.
Bruins, Some Observations (March 8, 1923) (E.R.A. Seligman Papers, Columbia Universi-
ty, Box 44, League of Nations folder). Senator Einaudi appears never to have contributed
substantive comments before the 1923 Report was drafted.
The economists met in Geneva in March, 1923, to hash out the details of the
Report. Einaudi was unable to attend the meeting. See SELIGMAN, supra note 81, at 140.
After the meeting, Seligman had exclusive responsibility for editing the manuscript. See
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the primary architect of the 1923 Report, was one of the few
living Americans who could claim authority equal to Adams’ on
taxation.216 Though similarly renowned as a tax authority, Selig-
man, a professor of political economy at Columbia, possessed a
very different intellectual style than Adams. Adams—a man who
held both academic and governmental posts throughout his life—
was pragmatic, instinctual, sensitive to political and administrative
constraints, and usually oriented toward the technical aspects of a
problem. In sharp contrast, Seligman—a lifelong academic—was a
grand, systematic thinker. Seligman did not ignore political and
administrative constraints, but he preferred to focus on the big
picture and avoid problems for which theory seemed inade-
quate.217
Letter from Leon Dufour to E.R.A. Seligman (April 11, 1923) (E.R.A. Seligman Papers,
Columbia University, Box 44, League of Nations folder). Einaudi was given the opportu-
nity to comment on this draft, but given the pressure of publishing deadlines, was told
that his comments could not be incorporated into the text; he simply had the choice of
signing on or not signing on to the draft. See Letter from Seligman to Einaudi (April 4,
1923) (E.R.A. Seligman Papers, Columbia University, Box 44, League of Nations folder).
Einaudi opted to sign on, although he had made virtually no input into the 1923 Report.
See Letter from Einaudi to Seligman (April 7, 1923) (E.R.A. Seligman Papers, Columbia
University, Box 44, League of Nations folder).
In sum, the relative contributions of each of “the four economists” to the 1923
Report may be ranked, in descending order of importance: Seligman, Stamp, Bruins, and
Einaudi. Significantly, Einaudi, the least important, was the only one of the economists
from a net debtor nation (Italy). Seligman later expressed regret about this, fearing that
the Report had been somewhat unbalanced in its presentation. See SELIGMAN, supra note
81, at 140.
216. For a discussion of Seligman’s contributions to tax theory, see HAROLD M.
GROVES, TAX PHILOSOPHERS 39–47 (1974); Hovenkamp, supra note 28, at 1004–09.
Seligman (1861–1939) was a “foremost early proponent of the net income tax in the
United States.” GROVES, supra, at 42. Like Adams, Seligman was an active member of
both the National Tax Association and the American Economic Association. His influ-
ential text, Essays in Taxation, went through ten editions—“setting something of a re-
cord” for tax treatises. Id. at 40. Moreover, perhaps because this and his other books
read so much like legal treatises, see Hovenkamp, supra note 28, at 1009, Seligman was
said to be “[t]he Progressive Era economist with the greatest explicit influence on judicial
policymaking.” Id. at 1004.
217. As an example, Seligman’s book on double taxation devotes twenty-six pages to
the history of thinking about the subject (beginning in the thirteenth century!) and thirty
pages to an abstract taxonomy of taxes, but contains hardly a word about the allocation
of business income among source nations. See SELIGMAN, supra note 81, at 32–57, 58–87.
In contrast, Adams called the apportionment of business income “the most important
technical problem in this field,” Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 121, and de-
voted much attention to the issue. In 1929, he obtained a grant from the Rockefeller
Foundation to study the subject, a project on which he was still working at the time of
his death in 1933. See Carroll, supra note 109, at 702.
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Three great principles—all characteristically Seligman’s—
shaped the 1923 Report: 1) The classification and assignment of
specific categories of income to source or residence should be
determined by an objective test, “economic allegiance,” whose
purpose was to weigh the various contributions made by different
states to the production and enjoyment of income;218 2) Existing
tax practices across the globe tended to underestimate the contri-
bution of residence and to reflect a misguided belief in the natu-
ralness and rightness of source-based taxation;219 and 3) Progres-
sive taxes on global income were fundamentally different than
other taxes and ought to be the unique province of residence-
based taxation.220
218. See 1923 Report, supra note 52, at 18–25. “The problem consists in ascertaining
where the true economic interests of the individual are found. It is only after an analysis
of the constituent elements of this economic allegiance that we shall be able to deter-
mine where a person ought to be taxed or how the division ought to be made as be-
tween the various sovereignties that impose the tax.” Id. at 20. Seligman developed the
concept of economic allegiance in his early, path-breaking text Essays in Taxation, in
which he optimistically argued that “all modern governments” are shifting to economic
allegiance as the basis of tax jurisdiction. See SELIGMAN, supra note 108, at 110–11.
219. See 1923 Report, supra note 52, at 40. The 1923 Report leveled the following
attack on existing practices:
[I]f we recognised facts and were not prevented by historical accidents and
administrative cowardice or frailty from taxing every man in one sum upon his
total resources instead of getting at him piecemeal, the “origin” idea would be
far less instinctive. It leads direct to the consequence that countries creditor on
balance should bear the main cost of relieving double taxation, and countries
debtor on balance should contribute nothing to that cost. Although countries
hold so instinctively to this origin principle in theory (and actually apply it
when the foreigner has made investments already and is helpless), they drop the
principle at once as soon as the practical question of new investment arises.
Can origin, then, be so sacred a principle?
During the past year or so loans have been sought, for example, in the
British money market by numerous foreign borrowers; Australia, New Zealand,
France, Brazil have each recently issued their securities yielding fixed rates of
return. One and all are distinguished by a common feature, namely, the exemp-
tion of the yield from all taxation, present or future, of the borrowing country.
Id.
220. See id. at 45–46. The 1923 Report represents something of a repudiation of the
American foreign tax credit: as a progressive tax on worldwide income, the American
income tax, under the reasoning of Seligman and the other League economists, should
not have deferred in any sense to foreign source-based levies. Seligman’s support for
exclusively residence-based taxation in the context of progressive levies on worldwide
income, which is comparable to the International Chamber’s 1921 treatment of “super
taxes,” rested on two distinct concerns. First, he wished to distinguish between taxes
levied solely on the theory of “ability to pay” from other taxes. Seligman regarded “abili-
ty-to-pay” taxes as substantially different in kind and distinctly personal in nature; in
these characteristics, Seligman found important implications for jurisdiction: “[I]f the tax is
a purely personal one, much may be said for the contention that the country of domicile
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The 1923 Report recommended a scheme that rested on a
distinction between taxes on global income and all other taxes.
The former were to be levied based solely on residence, while the
latter were to be divided between residence and source based on
the principle of economic allegiance, a principle that turned out to
be quite generous to residence. Of most practical importance, the
1923 Report allocated taxes on interest and dividend income to
the country of residence (that is, of the recipient).221 Finally, na-
should have the right to impose the tax. The person is taxable as such where he is; the
tax adheres to, or inheres in, the person.” SELIGMAN, supra note 81, at 110. In contrast,
he viewed other taxes as resting, at least in part, on a benefit theory—the taxpayer was
being charged for the value of specific services rendered by the government. Jurisdiction
for such taxes might more logically rest on the relative contributions of various nations
to the production or consumption of the wealth being taxed. See id. In contrast, Adams
regarded the notions of benefit and ability to pay as not easily separable. See text ac-
companying notes 54–64.
In addition to this argument, Seligman also rested his position on the inability of
theory to produce clean allocations of business income. See 1923 Report, supra note 52,
at 45 (“[I]t is almost impossible in economic theory to get a direct assignment of a quan-
titative character of finally resultant income amongst all the national agents who may be
said to have had a finger in the pie.”). Seligman’s principle of economic allegiance was
designed to weigh the competing claims of residence and source, but was of little value
when there was more than one claim, as when a product was manufactured in one coun-
try and sold in another. In the absence of any clear theoretical solution to the source
problem, the 1923 Report considered the possibility of an arbitrary division between
treaty partners: for example, when a product is made in one country and sold in the
other, each nation is entitled to tax one half of the profits. See id. at 51. The 1923 Re-
port held “out no hopes of this proving to be a smooth and practicable arrangement. It
can only be approximate and not an instrument of that degree of sensitiveness and accu-
racy which developed communities expect.” Id.
Seligman ultimately wished to safeguard the ability of nations to levy progressive
taxes on the worldwide income of residents—an understandable goal, and one that was
largely shared by Adams with respect to taxation of individuals—but transformed this
principle into an absolute preference for residence-based taxation. Alternatively, progres-
sive rates might be protected through an American-style FTC: worldwide income is as-
sessed at progressive rates set by the nation of residence, but source nations pocket a
share of the ultimate tax liability. Seligman, however, rejected the FTC as being too
much generosity to ask of creditor nations. See id. at 41–42. But the approach he en-
dorsed placed an equally great burden on debtor nations. In the end, Seligman simply
seems to favor residence-based taxation, though not for the world-wealth maximization
reasons often used to justify residence-based taxation today.
221. See id. at 39. Thus, interest and dividends going from an entity in one country to
an individual in another could not be taxed at all in the source nation. The source na-
tion was not entitled to levy a global income tax on foreigners and could not levy spe-
cialized withholding taxes on interest and dividends. The aversion of the 1923 Report to
withholding taxes has been an enduring feature of international treaty making. One of
the main functions of contemporary tax treaties has been to reduce such taxes. See Ault,
supra note 16, at 568–69. This tendency has been subject to criticism as it builds into the
tax treaty network an assumption of classical corporate taxation, i.e., separate taxation of
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tions of residence were not expected to provide a credit for taxes
paid abroad, even if such taxes were legitimately allocated abroad
under the economic allegiance principle.
Modern scholars have characterized the 1923 Report as “the
intellectual base from which modern treaties developed.”222 The
importance of the 1923 Report, however, has been overempha-
sized, although echoes of both its organizational structure and its
rejection of source-based taxation of interest and dividends can be
discerned in modern tax treaties. The legislation enacted in the
United States in 1919 and 1921 and the work of the International
Chamber were undoubtedly more important. One of the principal
methods considered in the 1923 Report for the international taxa-
tion of income—the exemption of nonresidents from source coun-
try tax—has been of virtually no import outside of Great Brit-
ain.223
While the 1923 Report envisioned the development of a mod-
el tax treaty, it was not such a model treaty itself. An entirely
different body of individuals was left with the task of drafting
income at the corporate and the shareholder level. See id. If dividends were allocated to
source, rather than residence, nations would be in a better position to implement integra-
tion with respect to foreign shareholders in a way that is consistent with the treatment of
domestic shareholders.
Other allocation rules in the 1923 Report were less controversial and generally
reflect the substance of the American rules from the 1921 Act, such as the allocation of
the income from real estate to the nation where the real estate was located.
222. Ault, supra note 16, at 567; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 1305–10.
223. See 1923 Report, supra note 52, at 47–48. The 1923 Report considered the ex-
emption of nonresidents as having three points in its favor: 1) exemption accorded with
the common practice of many nations in issuing tax-exempt securities to foreigners; 2)
exemption also accorded with the “true economic interests” of developing countries; and
3) exemption permitted escape from the theoretical difficulties of division and
classification. See id. at 48. The primary problem the economists saw with the exemption
of nonresidents was that it systematically disadvantaged debtor nations. See id. The econ-
omists did recognize that such an exemption might thus have difficulty gaining wide-
spread acceptance. See id. at 50. They saw no solution to this problem, although they did
express some optimism:
[A]s semi-developed countries become more industrialised, with the resulting
attenuation of the distinctions between debtor and creditor countries, the princi-
ple of personal faculty at the place of residence will become more widely un-
derstood and appreciated and the disparity between the two principles will be-
come less obvious, so that we may look forward to an ultimate development of
national ideas on uniform lines toward [the exemption of nonresidents], if not
as a more logical and theoretically defensible economic view of the principles of
income taxation, at least as the most practicable solution of the difficulties of
double taxation.
Id. at 51. In sharp contrast, the exemption of foreign source income was rejected out of
hand as being too much to ask of creditor nations. See id. at 41–42.
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model treaties, and this group decided a number of pivotal issues
barely addressed by the Report, such as the apportionment of
international business income.224 Moreover, an analysis of the
minutes of subsequent meetings of the treaty drafters (the Com-
mittee of Technical Experts) suggests that the opinions of the 1923
Report were rarely discussed or consulted. The term “economic
allegiance,” for instance, appears nowhere in the minutes of the
1927 meeting of the model treaty drafters, although controversy
over allocation rules dominated that conference. As the discussion
below makes clear, the preference for residence of the 1923 Re-
port was hardly shared by the Technical Experts. Ultimately,
Seligman himself came to regret that his chief co-contributors in
drafting the 1923 Report had also come from creditor nations
(Great Britain and the Netherlands), and feared that the Report
had reflected the interests and assumptions of creditor nations
overmuch.225 Finally, although the classification and assignment
structure of the Report has been termed “[p]erhaps [its] most
significant aspect,”226 this structure in fact merely reflected the
structure of the earlier Rome Resolutions of the International
Chamber of Commerce.
In sum, to characterize the 1923 Report as the fountainhead
of tax treaties is to miss much of the story. The conventional
account of the 1920s understates the precedents of the prior U.S.
tax legislation, the work of the International Chamber of Com-
merce, and the subsequent role played by the League’s Committee
of Technical Experts. It also overlooks the influence of tax treaties
concluded prior to the League’s first model treaty, many of which
also antedate the 1923 Report.227 The first important multilateral
tax treaty, signed at Rome in 1921 by Austria, Hungary, Italy,
Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania, as well as several contemporary
224. The 1923 Report contained a brief “addendum” on apportionment, which failed
to make any specific recommendation beyond noting that the experiences of the Ameri-
can states might prove instructive on the problem. See id. at 52–53. More generally, con-
temporaries found the Report to be “exasperatingly dull and difficult.” Letter from
Lockhart to A. Holcomb 1 (July 16, 1923) (available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale Uni-
versity, Box 14) (quoting with approval commentary by the London Economist on the
1923 Report). Another reader found the prescriptive section of the Report to be “incon-
clusive.” See Carroll, supra note 80, at 23, 25.
225. See SELIGMAN, supra note 81, at 141.
226. Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 82, at 366.
227. For an exhaustive description of these treaties, see HERNDON, supra note 103, at
10–18, 69–145.
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bilateral treaties, employed the same type of classification and
assignment scheme offered by the 1923 Report.228
Even before completion of the 1923 Report, the Fiscal Com-
mittee of the League of Nations had appointed a Committee of
Technical Experts, comprised of representatives from seven Euro-
pean nations, to develop more practical suggestions for mitigating
international double taxation.229 In 1925, the Technical Experts
presented a preliminary report, which, as noted above, was en-
dorsed by the International Chamber of Commerce.230 In es-
sence, the 1925 Report was an effort to transform the pro-resi-
dence 1923 Report into a more balanced product. The underlying
politics were obvious: while the 1923 Report was the product of
creditor nations, a majority of the drafters of the 1925 Report
came from debtor nations.231 The compromise reached by these
Technical Experts appropriated the 1923 Report’s distinction be-
tween taxes on global income and other taxes (now denominated
“personal” and “impersonal” taxes), but significantly changed the
consequences of this distinction.232 While Seligman and his col-
leagues had allocated personal taxes to residence and divvied up
impersonal taxes between source and residence, the Technical
Experts allocated personal taxes to residence and impersonal taxes
exclusively to source.233 This was an attempt to allow both credi-
tor and debtor nations their special jurisdiction.234 The Technical
Experts made no pretension of theoretical coherence: “The divi-
sion which we have established . . . has been made for purely
228. See Carroll, supra note 80, at 29.
229. See Carroll, supra note 109, at 697–98.
230. See supra text accompanying note 213.
231. Participants included representatives from Belgium, France, the United Kingdom,
Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia. See Carroll, supra note 109, at
697–98.
232. For a reprint of excerpts of the 1925 Report, see SELIGMAN, supra note 81, at
179–82.
233. See id. at 60–61.
234. The Technical Experts justified source-based taxation on the grounds that:
New countries which need foreign capital for their general development desire
to have a share in the taxes levied on income arising in their territory, and
they are unwilling to leave them to the countries, often already very rich, which
have provided the capital. Moreover, from a technical point of view, the collec-
tion of [source taxes], which does not involve the declaration by the taxpayer
of his total income, is, generally speaking, easier and surer than in the case of
the [personal taxes].
1925 Report, supra note 212, at 15.
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practical purposes and no inference in regard to economic theory
or doctrine should be drawn from this fact.”235
Adams, still active as chairman of the American Section of
the International Chamber’s Double Taxation Committee, plainly
felt that the 1925 Report represented a significant step forward
from the 1923 Report. He wrote that the Technical Experts’ 1925
Report
is based upon the frank recognition of the fact that the income-
tax serves two purposes; it must satisfy the claims both of the
country of origin and the country in which the taxpayer resides;
income will inevitably be taxed where it is earned and where the
taxpayer resides. This is the first time perhaps that full recogni-
tion has been given to the valid claims of the country of origin
and the country of residence.236
Seligman was less favorably disposed, although he tried to put a
positive spin on the 1925 Report, contending that the Economists
and the Technical Experts reached “virtually identical” conclusions
in that both groups agreed to the “adoption of domicile [resi-
dence] as the primary and general criterion applicable to pure
income taxes, and its modification by considerations of origin
[source] in the case of” impersonal taxes.237
The 1925 Report also called for the League of Nations to
consult representatives from additional governments and requested
authorization to draft a model bilateral agreement.238 As a result,
the Committee of Technical Experts was expanded from seven to
thirteen members by the time of its London conference in
1927.239 The United States, among the nations sending a delegate
for the first time in 1927, chose to be represented by T.S. Adams,
who would play an important leadership role in the League pro-
ceedings of 1927 and 1928.240
235. Id.
236. T.S. Adams, Untitled Comment Regarding the 1925 Report of the Technical
Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion to the Financial Committee of the League
of Nations 1–2 (July 5, 1925) (unpublished comment, available in T.S. Adams Papers,
Yale University, Box 13, 1924–1925 folder).
237. SELIGMAN, supra note 81, at 150.
238. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at 60.
239. The new representatives came from Germany, Poland, Japan, Venezuela, Argen-
tina, and the United States. See id. at 61.
240. In 1928, for instance, Adams was among the four most vocal delegates, speaking
more than thirty times during the proceedings. See id. at 176.
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A number of interests motivated the decision of the American
government to become involved in the League effort. First, with
only two creditor nations—Great Britain and the Nether-
lands—represented on the Committee, the American government
feared that its interests as a creditor might be prejudiced by the
ultimate structure of the model treaty. Second, the person-
al/impersonal distinction, while well suited to the tax systems of
various European nations, was ambiguous in the context of the
American system. For instance, the French employed a set of
schedular taxes on eight categories of income plus a graduated
general income tax—the former fit the definition of impersonal
taxes and the latter, personal. But the American income tax was a
far more unified affair; if the United States levied its entire tax
based on residence, without obligation to grant credits for foreign
source-based taxes—as apparently envisioned by the 1925 Re-
port—the model treaty would actually contradict the spirit of the
established FTC mechanism. Third, certain existing bilateral trea-
ties were more favorable to foreign businesses than was the Amer-
ican FTC. In nations participating in such treaties, American busi-
nesses were sometimes disadvantaged. The League model treaty
was viewed as a mechanism by which American businesses could
obtain access to a more advantageous competitive position.241
Fourth, the growth of American foreign trade and investment gave
the United States an interest in uniform, favorable international
tax rules. Fifth, the United States Chamber of Commerce and
other authorities wished to see the League push toward a multi-
lateral treaty, rather than a model bilateral treaty.242 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, tax concessions obtained from trading
partners might reduce the revenue cost of the FTC.243
The Technical Experts met in 1926, 1927, and 1928 to draft
model tax treaties, with the 1928 treaties becoming the definitive
League model.244 Through day after day of long and contentious
241. See id. at 63–64.
242. See id.
243. Mitchell Carroll, who assisted Adams at the 1927 and 1928 meetings as chief of
the foreign tax section of the United States Chamber of Commerce, recalled four decades
later that the American involvement was motivated by a desire to reduce foreign taxes
on American business so as to reduce the costs of the FTC. See Carroll, supra note 109,
at 693–94.
244. The Experts drafted separate treaties covering income taxation, succession duties,
administrative cooperation, and judicial cooperation. This Article only deals with the in-
come tax treaty, which was the primary focus of the Committee’s work. Between the
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negotiations, the Technical Experts generally tried to retain the
essential compromise of the 1925 Report: personal taxation by
residence and impersonal taxation by source. The most serious
intellectual difficulty confronting the Technical Experts was the
problem of translating this binary scheme into a workable treaty
that could be employed by nations with vastly disparate fiscal sys-
tems. As we have said, the compromise worked well enough with
a nation like France, which had two important, structurally distinct
income taxes, but did not fit well with the American or British
models of income taxation.245 The American income tax, for in-
stance, was comprised of a relatively flat normal tax levied on
residents, citizens, and non-resident aliens (though, of course, for-
eign-source income of the latter group was exempt), a significantly
graduated surtax on the same individuals, and a flat normal tax for
corporations. Which were the impersonal taxes?246
For nations with “unified”247 tax systems, the personal/imper-
sonal distinction raised a specter of uncertainty in the model trea-
ty. From the American perspective, the distinction presented a
1927 and 1928 meetings, representatives from fourteen additional governments were added
to the Committee’s membership, including delegates from the Soviet Union and many of
the nations carved out of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. For a complete list of
attendees, see HERNDON, supra note 103, at 175.
The drafting work of 1926–1928 culminated in the adoption of three different mod-
el income tax treaties, denominated Draft Conventions No. I–a, I–b, and I–c. Unlike
Draft Convention No. I–a, neither I–b nor I–c maintained the distinction between imper-
sonal and personal taxes. Draft Convention No. I–b assigned priority of taxation to the
state of domicile, while Draft Convention No. I–c incorporated elements of both I–a and
I–b. See 1928 Report, supra note 5.
245. Post-war France levied taxes on eight specific categories of income with rates
ranging from 6% to 18%, depending on the category and size of the income, as well as
a global income tax with graduated rates ranging from 1.2% to 30%. See HERNDON,
supra note 103, at 63. Everyone agreed that the schedular taxes were impersonal and the
global tax was personal. See id.
246. A number of alternatives presented themselves. For instance, the American “nor-
mal” tax might be treated as impersonal, though levied on the global income of residents
and citizens and the full amount of American-source income of nonresident aliens. See
Carroll, supra note 120, at 13–14. Alternatively, the income tax as a whole might be
treated as impersonal when levied on nonresident aliens—this was the view favored by
Adams. See Adams, Draft Convention, supra note 123, at 1. Meanwhile, Seligman, the
inventor of the personal/impersonal distinction would probably have characterized only
the corporate income tax as impersonal. See SELIGMAN, supra note 81, at 105–06
(classifying business taxes as “semi-personal,” a category which, like a strictly impersonal
tax, is “primarily a tax upon a thing”).
247. We use the term “unified” rather than the more common “global” in an effort
to avoid (further) confusion. Such a system generally is contrasted to a “schedular” sys-
tem. See AULT ET AL., supra note 13, at 155.
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substantive risk: if all or substantially all of the American tax
system were classified as personal, then the United States would
lose the right to tax based on source, and the U.S. income of non-
resident aliens would be free of U.S. tax liability.248 The distinc-
tion placed similar, though not identical, pressures on the British
system, but given the British commitment to residence-based taxa-
tion, the British representatives were less concerned about losing
jurisdiction over British-source income of nonresidents. From the
British perspective, the problem was that the personal/impersonal
distinction threatened the international competitiveness of British
business. British residents doing business abroad would be subject
to the full brunt of British income taxes, which were strictly res-
idence-based, plus the source-based portion of foreign income
taxes. Competitors from other nations, however, while subject to
the same foreign source-based foreign levies, would either be ex-
empt from home country taxes on their foreign source income or,
in countries that allowed a credit for foreign taxes, would face at
most a portion of their home income taxes. Such a situation would
have put pressure on Great Britain to grant a foreign tax cred-
it.249 Indeed, prior to the beginning of American involvement in
1927, the British representative and the other Experts had dis-
cussed a number of compromise measures.250
International competitiveness was of less immediate concern to
the United States because the U.S. already protected its businesses
248. The disparities in the importance of the American surtaxes and normal taxes
contributed to the problem. One possibility that was floating in the American delegation
was to have the American normal tax classified as impersonal, and thus levied on the
basis of source. See Carroll, supra note 120, at 13–14. This compromise would have mir-
rored the earlier system proposed by the International Chamber. See supra notes 286–87
and accompanying text. The objection in 1927, as during the Chamber process, was that
the American normal tax, at 5%, represented too small a share of the overall American
fiscal system. The personal/impersonal compromise would have left the American system
far more residence-based than the U.S. delegation desired. If the normal tax were raised
to 10%, the analysis might have been different, see Carroll, supra note 120, at 14, but
apparently such a change to domestic tax laws was beyond serious contemplation.
249. The threat posed to Britain by the personal/impersonal distinction is discussed in
Carroll, id. at 11–12.
250. Generally, these measures involved concessions in the source rules associated with
impersonal taxes. Perhaps the most important of these was the removal of the right of
payor nations to tax outgoing interest, which appeared in the 1927 draft, but was re-
moved from the 1928 draft. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at 186–87. At the same time,
the British were wrangling these concessions, they were also conceding that they would
need to grant an FTC to residents for taxes paid abroad on foreign-source income. See
id. at 218–19.
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with an FTC. However, the loss of much jurisdiction over domes-
tic-source income of nonresidents would have exerted fiscal pres-
sure on the FTC. Moreover, if U.S. tax treaties stated that the
U.S. income taxes should be residence-based, the political viability
of the FTC, which effectively surrendered much residence-based
taxation, might have been threatened.
When Adams arrived on the scene, his primary goal was to
emphasize the uncertainty surrounding the personal/impersonal
distinction so as to protect the ability of the United States to tax
nonresidents on U.S. source income. He argued that “[t]he recent
discussions of the Committee of Experts make it plain that the
items ‘personal tax’ and ‘impersonal tax’ are ambiguous.”251 Ac-
cordingly, he proposed to do away with the personal/impersonal
distinction, replacing it instead with the tautological categories
“origin taxes” and “residence taxes.”252 Origin taxes were defined
as those levied on non-residents based on source, while residence
taxes were those levied on residents based on worldwide in-
come.253 Under Adams’ plan, nations would be permitted both
forms of taxation—thereby protecting the right of the United
States to levy both its normal and surtaxes on nonresidents—and
double taxation would be avoided by virtue of credits against
residence taxes for origin taxes paid abroad.254 In essence,
Adams’ plan simply would have written the American internation-
al tax system into a model treaty. Even the source rules of
Adams’ plan were substantially the same as those of existing U.S.
legislation.255
Adams introduced his proposal mid-way through the 1927
meeting. Given the late date, Adams did not press for a formal
vote on the proposal, but succeeded in keeping it before the Com-
mittee for future consideration.256 By the time it met again, in
251. Adams, Draft Convention, supra note 123, at 1. Adams’ concern about the uncer-
tainty of the terms was also echoed by outside critics. See, e.g., May, supra note 128, at
72 (“The practical value of the distinction [between personal and impersonal taxes] has
been questioned, and it must be admitted that the modern income tax is usually in some
respects a personal and in other respects an impersonal tax.”).
252. See Adams, Draft Convention, supra note 123, at 3.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See Carroll, supra note 120, at 29.
256. Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Technical Experts on Double Taxation and
Tax Evasion to the Financial Committee of the League of Nations 9–10 (Apr. 8, 1927)
(available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, Box 16, Apr. 1927 folder).
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Geneva in 1928, the Committee had accepted the idea that dispari-
ties in fiscal systems would require the Experts to draft more than
one model treaty.257 Accordingly, the Geneva conference, which
marked the conclusion of the work of the Technical Experts,
adopted three different treaties: one for use by pairs of nations
with mixed income taxes (Draft I–a—a slightly modified version of
the 1927 draft), one for pairs with unitary systems (I–b), and one
for pairs with dissimilar systems (I–c).
Adams and the British representative drafted I–b, which ulti-
mately reflected a combination of the American and British posi-
tions.258 The treaty made no mention of the terms “personal”
and “impersonal,” instead articulating a general preference for
residence-based taxation (the British position).259 But Model I–b
also permitted source-based taxation on certain classes of income,
most notably business income.260 The treaty also called for na-
tions to grant credits to residents for foreign-source taxes paid
abroad—the Adams trademark.261 In sum, the treaty substantially
addressed Adams’ primary concerns, protecting U.S. taxation of
most categories of U.S.-source income. Models I–b and I–c also
pointed toward the future direction of the international treaty
movement, in their rejection of the personal/impersonal distinction
and in the move toward residence-based taxation of interest and
dividends.262
If the great intellectual task of the 1927 and 1928 meetings
was the adjustment of the 1925 Report to the realities of the
world’s fiscal systems, the great political difficulty was mediating
the continuing tension between creditor and debtor nations. The
most visible sign of this tension was agitation, primarily from the
British representative, for allocation of more income to residence
countries.263 The British desired most to eliminate source-based
taxation of interest and dividends, a position that sparked the most
bitter exchanges during the conferences.264 Although not success-
257. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at 174–75.
258. See id. at 235.
259. See id. at 235–39.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 238–39.
262. See id. at 235–41.
263. The locus of this conflict (at least in 1927 and during the 1928 discussion of I–a)
was the source rules applicable to impersonal taxes. Although impersonal taxes were
supposedly only to be levied based on source, this principle was never sacred, and vari-
ous exceptions grew up over time.
264. See id. at 240. In one such exchange, the Belgian Expert accused the British
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ful in changing the source rules of I-a, the British arguments pre-
vailed in I–b and influenced I–c.265
Although the United States, like Great Britain, was also a
creditor nation, the U.S. was less concerned with interest and div-
idend rules than with business income. On the latter issue, the
American preference for source-based taxation did not conflict
with its interest in reducing taxes levied by other nations on
American businesses. While Adams wanted both to improve the
competitiveness of American businesses and to reduce the revenue
cost of the FTC, his primary concern was to rationalize source-
based taxation to preclude taxation by all conceivable sources.266
Aside from elimination of the personal/impersonal distinction, this
seemed to be the chief goal of the American delegation. Mitchell
Expert of putting his nation’s economic interests ahead of the general interests, and
claimed that the British position would reduce debtor nations to “economic servitude.”
See Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax
Evasion to the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, 6–7 (Apr. 12, 1927) (avail-
able in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, Box 16, Apr. 1927 folder).
265. Under Draft Treaty I–c, interest and dividend income were allocated to the na-
tion of the recipient (the British position); however, the nation of the payor was entitled
to levy a withholding tax on the income at the source, in which case the recipient nation
was expected to exempt the income or provide a credit for the foreign tax. See
HERNDON, supra note 103, at 239–40. This approach seems the closest of the three to
the subsequent development of the international model treaty by the OECD. The current
version of the OECD Treaty sources interest and dividends to the nation of the recipi-
ent, but permits limited withholding taxes by the payor-nation. See OECD Model Treaty,
supra note 188, art. 10–11. Today the U.S. Model Treaty differs from the OECD Treaty,
and more closely resembles Draft Treaty I-b, by prohibiting payor-nation withholding
taxes. See RICHARD DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAX IN A NUTSHELL 101 (1993).
With respect to most other source rules, the three League models of 1928 were in
closer agreement. For instance, income from immovable property was sourced to the
nation where the property was situated, while wages and salaries were to be taxed in the
nation in which the employment was carried out. The current OECD Treaty mirrors
most of these consensus source rules of 1928, although there have been some technical
modifications. For instance, income from immovable property is sourced to the place
where situated (Article 6) and the remuneration for “dependent personal services” de-
pends on the place of employment (Article 15), but the current model distinguishes “in-
dependent personal services,” the income from which is sourced to residence (Article 14).
Similar provisions are found in Articles 14 and 15 of the U.S. Model Treaty.
As noted earlier, Adams’ 1921 Act sourced dividends and interest to the nation of
the payor (which is still the position of U.S. domestic law). The 1921 Act, however, fore-
shadowed other aspects of the 1928 Model Treaties, including their treatment of income
from immovable property and personal services. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136,
§ 217(a), 42 Stat. 227, 244. Again, these source rules generally remain intact in current
U.S. law. See I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 897(c) (1994).
266. See Carroll, supra note 109, at 693–94.
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Carroll, Adams’ assistant in 1927 and 1928, recalled the growing
problem facing American businesses abroad:
After World War I when governments were in dire need of
revenue to rebuild their economies, they began to try to tax the
earnings of the visiting businessman and the profits of the foreign
company on goods sold through him. Canada even tried to tax a
United States firm on profits from advertising its wares and re-
ceiving mail orders from customers in its territory.
In the early 1920s, the British Board of Inland Revenue
sought to impose liability . . . [on] sales through a local commis-
sion agent . . . . [e]ven if the nonresident and his British inter-
mediary took pains to conclude the contract abroad . . . .267
In the face of this concern with expanding jurisdiction over busi-
ness income, the Committee of Technical Experts adopted the
“permanent establishment” safeguard: only the nation in which the
permanent establishment of a business enterprise was located could
legitimately levy source-based taxes on the enterprise’s income.268
If the enterprise possessed permanent establishments in the territo-
ries of both treaty partners (say a head office in one nation and a
branch office in the other), then both partners were entitled to tax
the enterprise’s income, using some method of apportionment
agreed to beforehand.269 The 1928 treaties expressly excluded in-
dependent sales agents from the definition of “permanent estab-
267. Id. at 700. A business representative described the problem as follows:
Any plan which seeks to avoid double taxation by subjecting business income to
taxation only in the country where made . . . necessarily raises an issue as to
where income is earned. Further, it would be quite possible to have an inter-
national correlation of income tax laws such as would theoretically eliminate
double taxation and yet the same would continue to exist under cover because
of conflicting and overlapping theories of allocation by which two or more
countries might consider the same income earned within their borders.
Letter from Elliott, Law Department of International Harvester Company, to T.S. Adams
1 (May 8, 1922) (available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, Box 12, 1921–22 fold-
er).
268. Permanent establishments were defined as:
The real centres of management, branches, mining and oilfields, factories, work-
shops, agencies, warehouses, offices, depots, shall be regarded as permanent
establishments. The fact that an undertaking has business dealings with a for-
eign country through a bona fide agent of independent status (broker, commis-
sion agent, etc.), shall not be held to mean that the undertaking in question has
a permanent establishment in that country.
HERNDON, supra note 103, at 195 (quoting Draft Convention No. I–a, art. 5, reprinted in
1928 Report, supra note 5, at 7–9).
269. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at 196.
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lishment.”270 The United States, a major net exporter of goods in
the 1920s, thus relieved its businesses of much foreign taxation
with the permanent establishment rule, while preserving the spirit
of source-based taxation. Adams later declared that the permanent
establishment rule was “the most important field of agreement”
among the Technical Experts.271 Indeed, the “permanent estab-
lishment” threshold for business taxation has proven remarkably
durable, remaining a central component of both the OECD (Arti-
cle 7) and U.S. (Article 5) Model Treaties. By contrast, under U.S.
statutory law, a foreign resident is subject to U.S. taxation on
income that is “effectively connected” with a U.S. trade or busi-
ness, regardless of whether a permanent establishment is in-
volved.272 Under the 1921 Act, a nonresident alien could become
liable for U.S. taxes merely for conducting a sale in the United
States.273
Although the League did not at this time take up the appor-
tionment of business income in a serious way, it did introduce the
principle of arm’s-length allocation in the context of its permanent
establishment clause.274 With the notable exception of the United
States, which had endorsed such a method in the 1921 Act, this
method was until then unknown.275
270. See id.
271. Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 108.
272. See I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882(a) (1994).
273. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 217(e), 42 Stat. 227, 244–45.
274. See Draft Convention No. I–a, art. 5 cmt., reprinted in 1928 Report, supra note
5, at 12 (“The words ‘bona fide agent of independent status’ are intended to imply abso-
lute independence, both from the legal and economic point of view. The agent’s remuner-
ation must not be below what would be regarded as a normal remuneration.”).
275. One imagines that Adams would have also been sympathetic to a formulary
system such as the one he helped develop in Wisconsin; he seems to suggest as much in
an essay written shortly before his death. See Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at
121–22. Moreover, Adams’ 1921 Act called for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
develop “formulas of general apportionment” to allocate income from sources partly
within and partly without the United States, such as income arising from the manufacture
of goods in one country and sale in another. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136,
§ 217(e), 42 Stat. 227, 244–45. This aspect of the 1921 Act source rules seems to have
been somewhat less durable than others: current U.S. law employs a direct method of
apportionment via the “effectively connected” test, rather than an indirect formulary
apportionment. See, e.g., AULT ET AL., supra note 13, at 435.
Regardless of his own personal preferences, Adams did not press the appor-
tionment issue during the 1927 and 1928 League conferences, perhaps in recognition of
the great disparity in existing systems of apportionment. For a description of then exist-
ing systems, see Carroll, supra note 109, at 704–05. Surely, taking up the problem of
apportionment would have threatened the fragile set of compromises reflected in the
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V. LESSONS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FROM
ADAMS’ “ORIGINAL INTENT”
The common attribution of the foundations of U.S. interna-
tional tax policy to the 1923 Economists’ Report—Seligman’s
work—has exaggerated Seligman’s importance and downplayed
Adams’ central role. It also has offered comfort to today’s analysts
who quest for discovery or refinement of a unifying theory of in-
ternational taxation as the fountainhead of answers to current
questions of international tax policy, and in some instances has
provoked mistaken claims of an unbroken lineage of a U.S. policy
emphasis on residence-based over source-based taxation, which we
have shown here to be false. In sharp contrast, T.S. Adams re-
garded the claims of the country of source as primary to the
claims of the country of residence, particularly in business taxation,
and explicitly rejected the potential usefulness of any grand theory,
of what he called “broad dogmatic generalization” in making inter-
national tax law.
A. Theory vs. Practical Wisdom
In studying Adams’ work on international taxation, one labors
in vain to find a clear First Principle from which his tax proposals
flowed. He regarded “[i]dealism as a striving after perfect truth or
justice,” as “mostly a nuisance,” which “does more harm than
good, if injected into practical affairs.”276 He regarded John Stu-
art Mills’ observation that “[t]he ends of government are as com-
prehensive as those of the social union” as the “deepest truth
applicable to taxation and taxmaking.”277 Adams was also clear
in his view that “[d]ouble taxation cannot be brought within rea-
sonable limits by constitutional restraints or by theories of jurisdic-
model treaties of 1928. The League subsequently published a model Allocation Conven-
tion in 1935. See id. at 705–06. This Convention called for permanent establishments to
be taxed based on the income that each would have earned hypothetically were it a
distinct and separate enterprise. See id. This standard has largely been carried forward
into Article 7 of the current OECD Treaty.
For an extended treatment of the allocation problem circa 1932, see Mitchell
Carroll, A Brief Survey of Methods of Allocating Taxable Income Throughout the World,
in LECTURES ON TAXATION 131 (Roswell Magill ed., 1932).
276. T.S. Adams, Ideals and Idealism in Taxation, 18 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 5 (1928)
[hereinafter Adams, Ideals and Idealism].
277. Id.
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tion resting on the essential nature of particular taxes.”278 In-
stead, he viewed the economic self-interest of nations and private
actors as the controlling political force. Adams generally avoided
reasoning deductively from simple starting assumptions to concrete
policy prescriptions. His work reflected a subtle balancing act
involving a large number of interrelated imperatives and instincts.
Adams strove to achieve fair, nondiscriminatory taxation;
greater exports of American goods and capital; protection of U.S.
taxation of U.S.–source income; maximally administrable taxes
(which to him generally implied source-based taxation); some pro-
tection of progressive rate structures; elimination of inefficient tax
avoidance devices; maintenance and export of the American FTC
mechanism; and clarity and international uniformity in internation-
al rules for determining the source of various categories of income.
Adams’ work was an amalgam of principled idealism, national self-
interest, and political and administrative practicality. Adams may
fairly be criticized for a lack of theoretical coherence and for his
inattention to the kinds of economic principles that dominate de-
bate today, such as worldwide wealth maximization, capital export
neutrality, and capital import neutrality.279
278. Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 124.
279. Reading Adams’ works today, it may seem odd that Adams was even considered
an economist during his own time. In fact, Adams was an influential economist who was
awarded with positions of leadership by his colleagues. See supra notes 28, 42 and ac-
companying text. Adams’ writing focuses far less on abstract reasoning and the models of
classical economics than on institutional structure and capacity, technical aspects of draft-
ing and implementing legal regulations, and the empirical study of actual practices of real
people. These interests and methods made Adams a participant in what Herbert
Hovenkamp has called “the first great law & economics movement,” which he dates to
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Hovenkamp, supra note 28, at 994.
During the late nineteenth century, when Adams was a student, economics was in a state
of turmoil, as the discovery of marginal analysis had undermined the assumptions of
British Classicism and the arrival of German Historicism in America had provided new
perspectives on the social sciences. See id. at 995–96. There was “uncertainty within the
economic community as to whether economics was a behavioral, historical, or a purely
formal science.” Id. at 996. Henry C. Adams, a professor at Johns Hopkins at the same
time T.S. Adams was a graduate student there, played a pioneering role in bringing the
German approach to America, rejecting laissez-faire dogma in favor of highly particular-
ized, industry-by-industry analyses of the appropriate role of government regulation. Id. at
997–98. Concurrently, the founders of institutionalism were bringing to economics the
understanding that people are not simply rational wealth-maximizers, and that “ideology,
technology, history, habit, previous investment, and lack of information or difficulty in
communication drive both individual human motivation and institutional structure.” Id. at
1014. T.S. Adams clearly absorbed the lessons of the institutionalists. Indeed, the Ameri-
can Economic Association, of which T.S. Adams was a long-time member and ultimately
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Yet Adams’ lack of theoretical pronouncements was no acci-
dent; he was not ignorant of the theory of his day. Thomas Sewall
Adams expressly rejected the utility of theory in his fight against
international double taxation, regarding theory as endlessly mallea-
ble.280 He considered it child’s play to manipulate theory to ad-
vance parochial interests and private agendas. He insisted, “[p]rove
to Jurisdiction A that a given tax, X, logically belongs to Jurisdic-
tion B, and—if self-interest so dictates—A, in the long run, will
develop some subtle modification of tax X which the accepted
theory of jurisdiction assigns to A.”281 In particular, Adams criti-
cized Seligman’s theory of economic allegiance:
As a theoretical guide through the tax maze which we are dis-
cussing, economic authorities whom both the business and the
scientific worlds properly respect, have sponsored a theory of
“economic allegiance.” I find this theory, I regret to say, little
more than a generalized label covering a number of separate
judgments which the authors of the theory have reached about
the expedient place to tax certain persons or transactions, con-
clusions based upon diverse considerations which unfortunately
vary with the business habits and stage of development of the
various countries of the world. With most of the judgments un-
der this theory I happen to agree. But their justifications are
practical not “scientific,” and “economic allegiance” is distinctly
different in different states. The theory leads many of its advo-
cates to endorse exaggerated claims concerning the rights of the
jurisdiction of domicile. These exaggerated claims rest partly on
the fact that their advocates are citizens of creditor states. In
part also, they reflect an unconscious rationalization of the demo-
cratic urge towards progressive taxation. People come to believe
that the rich ought to pay higher rates of taxation than the poor.
And then they build up ambitious theories of taxation or tax
president, was actually founded in 1885 as a forum for institutional economics. Id. at
1021–22. Since Adams’ time, of course, the uncertainty over the nature of economics as a
discipline has been resolved in favor of “formal science.” The oddity today of considering
Adams an economist reflects the shift of the discipline’s field of vision. See id. at 1056.
280. In other contexts, too, Adams took something of an agnostic position on grand
theoretical systems. In the conclusion to a textbook on the heated labor problems of his
day, Adams wrote: “[W]e may be moving towards socialism or we may be moving to-
wards anarchism, but whithersoever we do move, socialism, anarchism and every other
‘ism’ must stand or fall on the wisdom of its immediate proposals.” THOMAS SEWALL
ADAMS & HELEN L. SUMNER, LABOR PROBLEMS 546 (1905).
281. Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 125.
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jurisdiction whose only inner logic is that they serve the will to
tax progressively . . . . 282
The dispute between Adams and Seligman over economic
allegiance was but one of a series of similar disagreements be-
tween the two scholars over the proper role of theory in tax law-
making. For instance, Seligman, though subsequently a drafter of
New York’s state income tax, initially disapproved of state income
taxes because of the difficulty of apportioning business income
among different states involved in a transaction.283 Adams, how-
ever, argued that states should not be deterred for that reason. He
insisted that reasonably fair—if not theoretically sound—appor-
tionment formulas could in fact be worked out by the states.284
In a similar vein, Adams responded to Seligman’s criticism of the
Wisconsin apportionment scheme: “[It] can never be ‘absolutely’
correct because there is nothing absolute about it, but it can be
‘fair and reasonable.’”285
It is no surprise that Adams rejected all a priori jurisdictional
claims and regarded theory as generally inconclusive:
As regards the proper place or jurisdiction in which income or
property should be taxed, there are, not one, but many principles
or bases of taxation which are theoretically valid. Under the
income tax, for illustration, some tax may properly be collected
in the country where the taxpayer resides, some in the country of
which he is a citizen, some where the income is realized or re-
ceived, some where the income is earned—and the process of
earning frequently extends over two or more countries. All of
these places or jurisdictions may be different and in all of them,
theoretically, a valid tax may be imposed.286
Adams was clear that taxation based solely on residence was
neither practical nor politically realistic. He regarded residence as
a particularly impractical guide to the taxation of business income:
Here is a corporation whose owners live in jurisdiction A, whose
factory is in jurisdiction B, whose main offices are in jurisdiction
282. Id. at 126.
283. See EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 647–49 (1911).
284. See T.S. Adams, Annual Address of the President, Sept. 9, 1914, 8 NAT’L TAX
ASS’N PROC. 199, 200 (1914).
285. Letter from T.S. Adams to E.R.A. Seligman 2 (Mar. 30, 1914) (available in
E.R.A. Seligman Papers, Columbia University, Misc. Correspondence Section).
286. American Suggestions, supra note 56, at 1.
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C, and whose principal sales department is in jurisdiction D. It
needs no discussion to prove that each of these jurisdictions will
demand and in the long run will succeed in collecting some tax,
although the personal income tax would ordinarily be collected in
only two of these jurisdictions, and many advocates of the in-
come tax would confine the collection to jurisdiction A, in which
the individual owners reside.287
Adams regarded the problem of the taxation of international
shipping profits as presenting an important instance of the general
difficulty:
The taxation of a foreign shipping company under a national
income-tax law is a particularly difficult thing, as will appear if
you stop to think of the problem presented. A tramp steamer
comes from abroad and stopping, perhaps only a few days, takes
a lucrative cargo from New York, and moves off, perhaps not
touching again at the port for eighteen months or more. The
allocation of shipping profits to particular ports is intrinsically
difficult.288
Under these circumstances, shipping companies face a significant
threat of multiple taxation. With no natural means of allocation,
many nations could potentially overreach and tax a dispropor-
tionately large share of the company’s profits. In fact, however, in
the early 1920s little—though not zero—double taxation of ship-
ping companies actually occurred. Notwithstanding the legal au-
thority to tax foreign ships, in most countries “[t]he prevailing
custom is to tax only in the country of registry . . . .”289 Thus,
shipping profits represented a problem for theorists, but not for
businesses or governments. Adams moved to translate custom into
law, and by so doing to prevent the potential double taxation from
becoming actual. He refused to be distracted by the theoretical
difficulties of the problem:
To prevent this injustice [double taxation] the easiest course
would seem to lie in formally adopting . . . the principle now for
the most part followed by the leading maritime nations of the
world. It is more important to secure the adoption of one uni-
287. Adams, Taxation of Business, supra note 58, at 189.
288. Adams, Aspects of Double Taxation, supra note 65, at 194.
289. American Section Memo, supra note 192.
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form rule than to insist that an exactly correct theoretical rule be
developed.290
Adams pushed both the International Chamber of Commerce
and the League of Nations to encourage nations only to tax ship-
ping companies based on registry or on the company’s real center
of management, and also to extend this allocational rule to the
fledgling air transportation industry.291 The 1928 League drafts
reflected Adams’ position,292 and, so popular was the proposal,
virtually all maritime nations incorporated the shipping rule in
their own domestic legislation.293
In assessing the lessons of the shipping rule, Adams observed:
This substantial achievement in the movement . . . does not
represent an application or result of any fundamental theory of
“economic allegiance” or natural law of jurisdiction. On the con-
trary, it is in conflict with the principle of allocation recognized
by a large majority of the leading tax experts of the world: the
principle that in allocating the profits of a business enterprise
doing business in more than one country, an appropriate share of
the profits shall be assigned to each country in which the enter-
prise has a “permanent establishment”. . . important shipping
companies usually have permanent establishments in each country
from which they regularly derive a substantial volume of traf-
fic. . . .
The immunity from double (income) taxation which the
maritime shipping industry enjoys is a direct result of . . . the
International Chamber of Commerce, working along lines of
administrative “least resistance.”294
Indeed, “working along lines of administrative least resistance”
seems a nice description of Adams’ typical modus operandi, and
distinguishes him from theory purists of his day and ours. Adams’
skepticism of theory did not, however, translate into unrestrained
cynicism. He did see an important role for “ideals and idealism in
taxation.”295 For Adams, the key to good tax law and good tax
290. Id. at 2–3.
291. See id.; see also HERNDON, supra note 103, at 207.
292. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at 205–07.
293. See Adams, Aspects of Double Taxation, supra note 65, at 194–95.
294. Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 106–07.
295. This phrase is the title of an eloquent essay by Adams, see Adams, Ideals and
Idealism, supra note 276. In the essay, Adams called on economists to adopt a more
realistic attitude towards their role in the formulation of tax laws:
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treaties was the principle of “enlightened self-interest”—finding the
places where ideals and practical politics coalesced. He insisted
that “we shall eliminate, in the long run, only that measure and
degree of multiple taxation which the competing jurisdictions be-
lieve harmful to themselves.”296 Of the prospects for treaties re-
straining double taxation, Adams wrote: “The surprising and opti-
mistic phenomenon, however, is the number of agreements which
an enlightened self-interest makes possible, when the matter is
approached on practical grounds.”297 Given the necessary con-
straints of self-interest, Adams envisioned limited treaties repre-
senting incremental reforms. During the Chamber of Commerce
effort, Adams argued:
[a]ctual progress in the elimination of double taxation can best
be secured at the present time by endeavoring to agree upon,
and after such agreement, to secure the adoption by the principal
commercial nations, of a few definite proposals of a comparative-
ly restricted scope, which have been found in practice or which,
after careful consideration, promise to reduce or eliminate impor-
tant cases of double taxation.298
Again, the treatment of international shipping profits was a
paradigm—a modest reform advancing the ideal of reducing dou-
ble taxation, but consistent with national self-interest and adminis-
trative constraints. Later, after the League process generated sub-
stantial consensus on allocation rules except for those governing
interest and dividends, Adams urged the nations of the world to
The world needs the economist’s version of the truth when it is fashioned
after mature study. But let the economist cherish no illusion that it will prevail;
that belief is merely a bit of intellectual arrogance with which the scholar quiets
the growling of his own particular form of inferiority complex. The economist’s
“truth” is only one factor in the contest we call taxation. He little knows when
he launches it, on what side it will eventually fight, or in what unsuspected
ways it will count and tell. Wearing the white armor of “science,” it will fight
side by side with grimy forces seeking their own so-called selfish ends. It will
emerge from the contest a battered and a better truth. It will have gained
from, as much as it will have given to, its fellow contestants. It will have
proved to be no better and no holier than many of its fellows. It will have
proved more effective, the more completely its author—the economist—recog-
nized in advance its limitations, its functions, and the character of the other
contestants.
Id. at 8.
296. Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 125.
297. Id.
298. American Section Report, supra note 77, at 1; see also Adams, Double Taxation,
supra note 3, at 125 (arguing that double taxation could only be averted through agree-
ments based upon “practical grounds”).
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sign a multilateral agreement institutionalizing all of the consensus
rules, but leaving interest and dividends for another day.299 Ad-
ams saw little sense in pushing his ideals beyond what the interna-
tional community perceived as its own interests.300 In a different
context, he wrote, “The dominating factor of economic interest in
taxation determines to a large extent the role or place of idealism
in taxation. . . . [A]las for the idealist whose convictions call for a
forthright and conscious sacrifice of the obvious economic interest
of the majority.”301
B. Adams’ Emphasis on Collectibility, Certainty and Simplicity
Given his emphasis on practicality over theory, it is not sur-
prising that Adams’ policy judgments were often driven by con-
cerns for the enforcement and collection of taxes. While in Wis-
consin, Adams had witnessed firsthand the inequities that resulted
from a tax system that was not successfully enforced. In particular
the old personal property taxes in Wisconsin and across the coun-
try were notorious for failing to capture intangible wealth, such as
stocks and bonds.302 As a result of evasion by urban business
classes, the weight of taxation fell disproportionately on the own-
ers of real property, which, in Wisconsin at the turn of the centu-
ry, primarily meant cash-strapped farmers. The Wisconsin farmers
fought back, demanding and eventually winning a state income
tax.303 To Adams, the lesson must have been clear: widespread
evasion resulted in unfairness and the delegitimization of a tax sys-
tem. Thus, Adams was profoundly concerned about the administra-
bility of any tax proposal.304
299. See Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 107.
300. Id. (“On certain subjects, the taxation of interest and dividends in particular,
there are deep seated differences of opinion and interest which show few signs of disap-
pearing.”).
301. Adams, Ideals and Idealism, supra note 276, at 4.
302. See JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 30–31
(1985). For a discussion of the particular failings of the Wisconsin property tax, see
BROWNLEE, supra note 103, at 45–46; Adams, Wisconsin Income Tax, supra note 30, at
572. In one of his first published writings, Adams criticized the Maryland tax system for
similarly failing to capture the wealth represented by personalty. See Adams, Taxation in
Maryland, supra note 107, at 73.
303. See BROWNLEE, supra note 103, at 44–64 (recounting the history of the Wiscon-
sin income tax and describing the mobilization of rural interests behind the income tax
proposal).
304. Adams often expressed fears about the imminent demise of the income tax. For
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Adams’ sense of the moral wrongness of tax systems that lend
themselves to evasion is particularly evident in his writings on the
tax system imposed on Puerto Rico by Spain.305 He wrote,
“[T]he direct taxes were largely evaded through the complexity of
the law and the venality of the officials, while the greater burden
of the indirect taxes was shifted from those who owned property
and were able to protest effectively, upon a sodden, inarticulate
peon class . . . .”306
To understand the centrality of collection and enforcement in
Adams’ work, it is important to realize that, to Adams, tax avoid-
ance implicated concerns that went well beyond simple losses of
revenue to the Treasury. Adams felt that the very legitimacy of
the income tax was threatened by widespread avoidance and eva-
sion. Moreover, tax avoidance might result in the diversion of
capital to unproductive purposes, which is a concern that was
evident in Adams’ resistance to the spread of tax-exempt securities
in international markets.307
example, he wrote, “The probability is strong that in four or five years the income tax
will, as a matter of practical politics, be past patching.” WITTE, supra note 40, at 91
(quoting a letter from Adams to the Ways and Means Committee) (emphasis omitted).
Elsewhere, he observed, “A successfully administered income tax I believe to be an es-
sential part of financial democracy. Personally, therefore, I should regard its breakdown
as something in the nature of a political tragedy.” Thomas S. Adams, Should the Excess
Profits Tax Be Repealed, 35 Q.J. ECON. 363, 370 (1921).
In addition to the failure of certain state property taxes, Adams also witnessed
first-hand the rise and fall of the federal excess profits tax on business income. Adams
himself changed over time from a supporter to an opponent of the tax; in the end, he
felt that the complexity of the excess profits law exceeded the administrative capacity of
the federal government. See id. at 371. Indeed, the problems of the excess profits tax
contributed to Adams’ fears about the future of the income tax: “No federal administra-
tion, in my opinion, is capable during the next five or six years of carrying with even
moderate success two such burdens as the income tax and the excess profits tax.” Id. at
370. Adams has been deemed the “most influential” authority behind the eventual repeal
of the excess profits tax. See Rader, supra note 32, at 419.
305. See T.S. Adams, The Financial Problems of Porto Rico, 17 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 444, 445 (1901) [hereinafter Adams, Financial Problems]; Thomas S.
Adams, Porto Rican Finance Under the Spanish and American Governments, 3 PUBS. AM.
ECON. ASS’N 314, 330 (1902).
306. Adams, Financial Problems, supra note 305, at 445.
307. Tax avoidance generally, and investment in tax-exempt securities specifically, also
presented a threat to the ability-to-pay principle of income taxation. It might be argued
that tax-exempt securities do not threaten ability-to-pay because tax-exempts typically
carry lower interest rates than other bonds, with the foregone interest representing an
implicit tax on the bondholder. Adams, however, believed that the interest rates of tax-
exempts did not reflect the tax savings received by taxpayers in the highest brackets, and
thus provided a windfall to those taxpayers who needed it least. See T.S. Adams, Untitled
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Adams was particularly sensitive to the potential for tax
avoidance in the international arena. Adams argued, “The modern
habit of living or incorporating in one jurisdiction and holding
property or doing business in another has led to much unjust
double taxation, but it has also led to a large volume of tax eva-
sion.”308 In Adams’ mind, the causes of, and the solutions to, tax
evasion and double taxation were intimately connected.309 An in-
Speech on Tax–Exempt Securities, 15 NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 261, 264 (1922) [hereinaf-
ter Adams, Untitled Speech].
The American foreign tax credit lessened the incentives for other nations to be-
come tax havens, or otherwise to compete with one another by providing tax relief for
the residents of other nations, such as by floating tax-exempt bonds in international capi-
tal markets. Thus, one of Adams’ chief targets in the 1927 and 1928 League of Nations
conferences was tax-exempt securities issued by foreign governments, paralleling a similar
crusade by his boss, Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, against the federal tax exemp-
tion for state and local government bonds. For a discussion of Mellon’s position, see
PAUL, supra note 93, at 132–33. In reaction to the high marginal rates of the 1918 Act,
high-income Americans had turned to tax-exempt securities on a massive scale; hence,
“the wealthier taxpayers” were effectively escaping surtaxes (and the yield of the income
tax was “shrinking rapidly”). See Adams, Fundamental Problems, supra note 61, at 529;
see also Adams, Untitled Speech, supra, at 262–63 (noting that reported taxable income of
taxpayers earning more than $300,000 a year dropped by more than half between 1916
and 1919 notwithstanding general economic prosperity). Such securities “pervert[ed] the
normal and natural habits of investment,” see id. at 264, and perhaps, as Mellon said,
“le[d] in many cases to unnecessary or wasteful public expenditures.” LOVE, supra note
94, at 58 (quoting a letter from Secretary Mellon to Congressman Green). Critics argued
that Americans only invested in tax-exempt government bonds as a means of escaping
federal income taxes. See WITTE, supra note 40, at 88. In a similar vein, Adams viewed
with alarm the tendency of foreign governments to offer bonds whose interest was free
of taxation by the issuing government. See Minutes of Meeting of Committee on Double
Taxation and Tax Evasion on April 7, 1927, at 5 (available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale
University, Box 16, April 7–8 1927 folder) (“[I]t would be disastrous for Europe to be
flooded with securities entirely exempt from taxation, as was the case in the United
States.”). In the interests of discouraging the further development of tax-exempt securities
in international capital markets, Adams supported amendments to the 1927 and 1928
draft treaties that would have provided for residence-based taxation of interest that was
not taxed by the source state—a reversal of his typical pro-source position. See id. at 2;
see also HERNDON, supra note 60, at 188. Adams’ efforts failed with respect to Draft
Convention No. I–a, see HERNDON, supra note 103, at 188–89, but the interest provision
of Draft Convention No. I–b, allocating interest to residence under all circumstances, may
in part have reflected Adams’ attempt to preserve a safeguard against tax-exempt securi-
ties.
In addition to tax-exempt securities, other forms of tax avoidance that were of
particular concern to Adams included: incorporation for purposes of avoiding surtaxes on
income, gifts to family members, the sale of securities at a loss, and “extravagant and
doubtful expenditure” by corporations (including much advertising). See Adams, Funda-
mental Problems, supra note 61, at 532–36.
308. Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 112–13.
309. The connection was also apparent to the League of Nations, which assembled the
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ternational tax system that carefully constrained double taxation
would both lessen the incentives for tax evasion and imply a de-
gree of international cooperation and administrative competence
that would lessen the opportunities for avoidance. Thus, Adams
could conclude that “[m]easures to prevent double taxation, if
properly devised, will result in almost as much gain as loss to the
fiscal authorities cooperating.”310
In the domestic arena, Adams was an outspoken advocate for
simplicity in taxation.311 Not surprisingly, he brought the same
concerns with him to the problems of international tax. Adams
declared himself more interested in developing simple, administra-
ble rules for the allocation of income to countries of source than
in getting the allocations themselves “correct.”312 Adams present-
ed the 1921 source rules to Congress as “altogether in the interests
of simplicity and clarity.”313 Later, in discussing the “primary
conditions” that should shape the drafting of a model treaty, Ad-
ams wrote: “There is a final condition of momentous impor-
tance—that of simplicity. There will be great administrative diffi-
culties in enforcing even the simplest of Bilateral Conventions. The
Committee of Technical Experts to draft model treaties dealing with both double taxation
and tax evasion. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at 58.
310. Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 126. Much of this reasoning likely
rests upon an understanding that tax systems—particularly income tax systems—cannot
function without a substantial amount of voluntary taxpayer compliance and honesty.
Adams observed, “The American taxpayer . . . . has been compared, confused, and used
synonymously with the liar. As a matter of fact, when confronted with an equitable tax
and a fearless assessor, he is amazingly honest.” Adams, Wisconsin Income Tax, supra
note 30, at 575 (emphasis added). The implication is that an inequitable tax—and Adams
clearly felt that double taxation deserved that label—will produce dishonest taxpayers.
Charles Bullock, a Harvard professor and colleague of Adams on the National Tax Asso-
ciation, made a similar point: “Not taxation itself, but unfair, excessive, and discriminating
taxation is what has made the average American a tax-dodger.” Charles J. Bullock, The
Federal Income Tax, 8 NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 264, 274 (1914).
311. Adams argued that “complexity [in tax legislation] is a major evil, involving the
taxpayer in a cloud of uncertainty, stimulating evasion and rebellion, clogging the admin-
istrative machine, and bringing the tax into disrepute.” Adams, Fundamental Problems,
supra note 61, at 552. Adams felt that the fundamental problem of the net income tax,
and of ability-to-pay taxation generally, was the inherent complexity of calculating the
tax. Although Adams recognized that public sentiment heavily favored the ability-to-pay
principle, he declared that he would “vote for simplicity and inequality, selecting many
simple taxes at light rates rather than more equitable but more complex taxes at heavier
rates.” Id. at 553.
312. See, e.g., American Section Report, supra note 77, at 2–3 (“It is more important
to secure the adoption of one uniform rule than to insist that an exactly correct theo-
retical rule be developed.”).
313. 1921 Hearings, supra note 39, at 66.
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execution of an ambiguous and complicated convention will prove
virtually impossible.”314 Adams thus opened the 1927 conference
of the Technical Experts with a call for greater clarity in draft-
ing,315 and continued to raise the issue throughout the meetings
of the Technical Experts, most notably in his efforts to have the
committee dispense with the confusing personal/impersonal distinc-
tion.316
Concerns for collectibility, enforcement and administrability
also shaped Adams’ preferences regarding source rules for specific
categories of income. He insisted: “[I]n agreements allocating tax
sources for the purpose of preventing double taxation, the tax
should not be assigned to a jurisdiction which cannot effectively
administer and collect the tax.”317 Adams felt that this principle
motivated many of the source rules that were already widely ac-
cepted internationally, such as the allocation of real estate to the
state where it was located for purposes of property, income, and
death taxes:
There is probably no very recondite economic or juristic theory
behind this approximate agreement to allocate taxes in respect of
real estate to the jurisdiction of situs. It certainly interferes with
progressive rating upon the entire income, estate or inheritance,
and conflicts with the theories usually advanced by defendants of
progressive income and inheritance taxes to explain or justify
them. The explanation probably lies in a mixture of consider-
ations arising chiefly in custom, administrative practicability, and
the will to avoid double taxation . . . . For a good many genera-
tions wisdom will lie in giving the tax to the jurisdiction that can
successfully administer it.318
Adams approved of the real estate rule for its ease of enforce-
ment.
314. Adams, Draft Convention, supra note 123, at 2.
315. See Minutes of Meeting on April 5, 1927, at 2 (available in T.S. Adams Papers,
Yale University, Box 16).
316. See Adams, Draft Convention, supra note 123, at 1. Adams, in fact, had a long-
running dispute with Seligman over the utility and clarity of the distinction. See Letter to
E.R.A. Seligman (Aug. 9, 1911) (available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, Box
25, 1911–1912 folder) (“There is no common understanding of the terms ‘real’ [imper-
sonal] and ‘personal’ taxes. . . . Ought we to place so much emphasis upon a general
concept which is not clearly understood?”).
317. Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 112.
318. Id. at 105–06.
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Adams also expressed concerns over source rules that were
open to taxpayer manipulation, such as the U.S. Attorney
General’s rule that sourced business income to point of sale.319
Such opportunities for manipulation raised all of the concerns
about tax avoidance that led Adams to place so much emphasis on
administrability.
Adams had an additional reason for stressing enforceability in
source rules: rules based on administrative practicability stood the
best chance of gaining widespread international acceptance. Adams
believed that nations would surrender tax jurisdiction only so long
as they could do so without incurring significant financial harm:
“[W]e shall eliminate, in the long run, only that measure and
degree of multiple taxation which the competing jurisdictions be-
lieve harmful to themselves.”320 Adams was sure that nations
would most easily be swayed to surrender jurisdiction over income
that they could not tax effectively anyway: “[A]greements to abol-
ish or restrain double taxation must be based on a variety of prac-
ticable grounds, among which the possibility of successful adminis-
tration is the most important.”321
Adams, so committed to the ends of reducing double taxation,
kept political salability and stability very much in mind while de-
signing the means. In his work on tax policy, Adams was an econ-
omist in the service of politics. He would be more than a little
disappointed at the monumental complexity which is the hallmark
of this nation’s international tax rules today.
C. Source vs. Residence
Normative analysis of international tax policy by economists
today emphasizes the goal of worldwide economic efficiency with a
policy of capital export neutrality as its instrument. This, in turn,
has led for calls for residence-based taxation of income earned
worldwide.322 But regardless of the modern economists’ analysis,
319. See supra text accompanying notes 143–45. Adams voiced similar concerns about
an International Chamber proposal to tax income “where earned.” 1922 Chamber Memo,
supra note 185, at 9.
320. Adams, Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 125.
321. Id. at 124–25.
322. See, e.g., BRADFORD, supra note 50, at 89–90 (“A number of considerations point
to the residence principle as the more desirable principle to establish”); PRESIDENT’S TAX
PROPOSALS, supra note 50, at 383 (“The longstanding position of the United States that,
as the country of residence, it has the right to tax worldwide income is considered ap-
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Thomas Sewall Adams’ view that countries where income is
earned will insist on taxing business income earned within their
borders remains as true now as in his time. Thus, Adams’ view
that the only unilateral action available to eliminate potential dou-
ble taxation of such income is for countries of residence to defer
to countries of source either by exempting such income or allow-
ing a foreign tax credit is as valid at the end of this century as it
was at the beginning.
Vigorous policy debate is now taking place over proposals to
replace the U.S. foreign tax credit system with an exemption for
foreign source income.323 Again, Adams’ views of the reasons to
choose between a foreign tax credit and an exemption system are
instructive. In general, Adams’ reasons for preferring the foreign
tax credit mechanism—particularly his appreciation of its role in
counteracting a “race to the bottom” in taxation by source coun-
tries—have lost none of their persuasiveness. Indeed, current calls
for replacing the U.S. income tax altogether with some form of
consumption tax can be viewed potentially as a major development
in such a race. Such a change would transform the United States
into the world’s major tax haven for income from capital.324 Im-
proving the “international competitiveness” of American investors
and businesses is a rallying cry of proponents of such a
change.325 Ironically, this kind of massive change in the U.S. tax
system would probably inspire many countries, which have, so far,
exempted foreign source income from tax, to embrace a foreign
tax credit system of the sort first put into place in the United
States more than seventy-five years ago.
On the other hand, the complexities of the existing foreign tax
credit law, which have developed principally to prevent averaging
of foreign taxes across different kinds of income and to protect the
U.S. tax base on U.S. source income, are extremely costly for tax-
payers to comply with and for the IRS to administer. Other coun-
tries—Australia and Canada, for example—have effectively com-
propriate to promote tax neutrality in investment decisions.”)
323. See, e.g., KEMP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 449–50; see also
HUFBAUER, supra note 12, at 93 (1992) (arguing that U.S. should abolish the foreign tax
credit and adopt a territorial system for taxing foreign corporate income).
324. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The International Implications of Tax Reform, 69 TAX
NOTES 913, 917 (1995).
325. See, e.g., KEMP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 426 (calling for a flat-
rate tax system to stimulate investment).
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bined foreign exemption and tax credit methods to reduce some of
the complexities, without shifting to a “territorial” policy that
limits taxation to income earned within their borders or abandon-
ing their claims to residual taxation of foreign source income.
Some European countries, including, for example, Germany and
the Netherlands, have gone even further in providing an exemp-
tion for foreign source business income.
The potential advantages of introducing exemption elements
for business taxation surely merit reexamination in the United
States today. Thomas Adams identified the principal concerns. In
his proposals for an exemption for foreign traders, Adams would
have restricted an exemption system to active business income. He
refused to consider extending such relief to passive investment
income, which, even then, he knew to be much more mobile and
manipulable. Second, Adams knew that exemptions should be
limited to foreign source income which is subject to taxation
abroad comparable to that which would be imposed by the United
States. This probably is best evinced by his concerns with the
international issuance of tax exempt bonds. Some such “compara-
bility” test is now used by most countries that have exemption
systems. Third, Adams’ emphasis on clear, explicit and, to the
extent possible, uniform source rules would be even more critical
if the United States were to exempt foreign source business in-
come. Likewise, Adams’ concerns with related party transactions,
such as payments of interest and royalties, makes clear that an
exemption system would not be free of many of the issues that
have for so long plagued implementation of a foreign tax credit
system. In sum, Adams’ insights are valuable in informing our own
analysis of the issues raised in substituting for the foreign tax
credit an exemption of limited categories of foreign source income.
Even on somewhat narrower issues of international tax policy,
asking how Thomas Sewall Adams would have approached the
question often is enlightening. For example, in 1989, the United
States added section 163(j) to the Internal Revenue Code to limit
deductions for interest paid on debt to related parties.326 This
provision was intended to limit the ability of foreign-owned busi-
nesses to avoid payment of U.S. tax on U.S. source income by
paying deductible interest rather than dividends.327 The 1993 Act
326. See I.R.C. § 163(j) (1994).
327. See H.R. REP. NO. 101–247, at 1240–50 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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extended these limitations to additional forms of debt between re-
lated parties and to certain third-party debt guaranteed by related
entities. These limitations have been frequently criticized by com-
mentators (apart from their complexities which are substantial)
principally on the ground that, in addition to attacking tax-
avoidance transactions designed to shift income from the United
States to a tax-haven country that imposes low or no taxes on
such income, this provision also denies interest deductions for
payments from the United States to another country with equiva-
lent or even higher tax rates. In so doing, it overrides the ability
of U.S. treaty negotiators to concede U.S. tax jurisdiction over
such amounts to other countries. If, however, following T.S. Ad-
ams, one takes as a prime goal of U.S. international tax policy the
collection of U.S. tax on U.S. source income, the provision looks
sensible and important, the rate of tax in the foreign country be-
comes irrelevant, and the major question for the United States
becomes whether the provision is appropriately broad and effec-
tive. Adams would also be clear that it is the responsibility of the
country of residence to alleviate any double taxation that might
result.
D. Multilateral vs. Bilateral Treaties
Thomas Adams recognized early that a multilateral, rather
than bilateral, approach to tax treaties was desirable. He pressed
for a multilateral solution to the problem of international taxation,
despairing of the complexity, administrability, and manipulatibility
of taxation under a large number of bilateral tax treaties. He was
optimistic about the prospect. “[I]t is entirely practicable for the
great nations of the world to get together and adopt a uniform
multilateral treaty by which double taxation could be eliminated,
except for these items of bond interest and dividends.”328 But
Adams was unsuccessful in getting the League of Nations to shift
its approach to double taxation from a model bilateral treaty to a
multilateral agreement. He claimed that the League’s approach
“would result in a tangle of conflicting solutions applicable to the
nationals of different countries, which [would] be highly complicat-
ed and highly mysterious, and about as bad as the situation now
1906, 2710–20.
328. Adams, Aspects of Double Taxation, supra note 65, at 196.
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exists.”329 However, no action was taken on Adams’ proposal for
a multilateral treaty during the 1928 League conference.330
Modern attempts at multilateral tax treaties, even on a region-
al basis, have also enjoyed limited success at best. There was a
brief Andean effort in 1971 and a similarly unsuccessful Caribbean
tax agreement.331 Probably the most successful example is the
Nordic tax treaty, but one thoughtful observer has remarked that
it serves principally to confirm that cultural regional cohesion has
advantages in taxation as elsewhere.332
The European community has abandoned the idea of a multi-
lateral tax treaty in favor of an effort to harmonize the domestic
tax laws of the member states.333 To date, there has been rela-
tively little progress toward harmonization in the income tax arena.
Probably the most notable effort has been the Ruding Comm-
ittee’s attempt to chart a path for greater uniformity in cross-bor-
der transactions involving countries with integrated corporate tax
systems.334
329. Id. at 195. Adams foreshadowed this argument with his earlier advocacy of a
single, nationwide standard for the apportionment of railway property for purposes of
state taxation: “[C]ompeting state jurisdictions should not—by using different methods of
apportionment—tax the same property twice; and . . . no interstate railway company, by
reason of existing laxity and confusion, should escape without the full taxation of all its
property in one state or another.” T.S. Adams, Valuation of Railway Property for Pur-
poses of Taxation, 23 J. POL. ECON. 1, 5 (1915).
330. See HERNDON, supra note 103, at 230.
331. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, Double Taxation Agreements of CARICOM: A Review of
Existing Practice and Prospective Policy Options, 47 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTA-
TION 129, 137 (1993); C. Gaston Perera, Double Tax Treaties in the Eastern Caribbean,
1993 BRIT. TAX REV. 395, 398.
332. See Vital, supra note 7, at 34–35.
The texts of the two multilateral Nordic double tax treaties show the strong in-
fluence of the bilateral treaties that they replaced, and, behind them, the work
of the OECD of which all five states are members. There are no major new
concepts or approaches in these agreements, which in some clauses resort to
lists to cover the differences between the treaty partners. But they have shown
that, given a common cultural and economic background, genuine multilateral
cooperation on an evolving basis is achievable.
DAVID W. WILLIAMS, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 87 (1991).
333. Article 220 of the EEC Agreement urges the adoption of bilateral treaties for
the elimination of double taxation. The first efforts at harmonization have focused on
value-added taxes and have been underway for thirty years.
334. See RUDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 18. For critical views on the
Ruding Report, see John Chown, Commentary on the Ruding Report, 32 EUROPEAN
TAXATION 123 (1992); Maarten J. Ellis, A Practitioner’s View of the Ruding Report, 32
EUROPEAN TAXATION 129 (1992); Rijkele Betten, Aspects of a Future EC Corporate Tax
System: Commentary on the Ruding Report and the Commission Guidelines, 32 EUROPEAN
TAXATION 314 (1992). For views of Committee members themselves on the Ruding Re-
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If anything, the need for multilateral cooperation has in-
creased since Adams’ time, but the likelihood of such action seems
no brighter today. Ironically, the enormous success of the network
of bilateral treaties, which began with the League of Nations Mod-
el in 1928 and has remained remarkably stable through the most
recent OECD model in 1992, itself serves to inhibit multilateral
action.335 The habit and flexibility of dealing bilaterally, along
with the entrenchment of the principles of the League of Nations
model, make it extremely difficult to move in the tax area toward
the kind of multilateral negotiating practice that, for example,
occurs through the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs
(GATT) in the international trade arena. Professor Richard Vann
of Australia has best described the difficulty:
Although it is possible to refine the actual terms of the OECD
Model and to elaborate the commentary so as to cover new cases
as they arise, the time has passed for radical revision within the
current bilateral framework. In a sense the opportunity to go in
another direction was lost before the 1963 draft appeared. The
failure to adopt any new approach to international tax after the
Second World War (compared to trade law and the international
monetary system) meant that effectively the solution adopted
after the First World War continued by default. In other words
the OECD Model is the culmination of 50 years of development,
rather than a new departure.336
port, see F. Vanistendael, Round Table on the Ruding Report: Some Basic Problems on
the Road to Tax Harmonization, 33 EUROPEAN TAXATION 22 (1993); Ken Messere,
Round Table on the Ruding Report: A Personal View on Certain Aspects of the Ruding
Committee Report and the EC Commission’s Reaction to It, 33 EUROPEAN TAXATION 2
(1993).
The Ruding Report recommended community-wide minimal rates of corporate taxa-
tion, the adoption of standard procedures for resolving transfer pricing disputes, harmo-
nized methods for depreciation and stock valuation and carry-back of losses. Not much
has come of the Ruding Committee’s proposals so far.
335. The 1928 Model was the basis for the 1964 OECD Model Treaty. See OECD
FISCAL COMMITTEE, DRAFT DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL
(1963). The 1977 Model changed relatively little and even the 1992 Model had relatively
few changes. See Ken Messere, The 1992 OECD Model Treaty: The Precursors and Suc-
cessors of the New OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 33 EUROPEAN
TAXATION 246, 248–49 (1993).
336. Richard J. Vann, A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-Pacific Region?, 45 BULL.
INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 99, 103 (1991). Indeed, one of the few occasions when
the 1920s League effort failed to have lasting success was in the proposal for a multi-
lateral dispute resolution procedure. See supra notes 203, 244.
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This status quo will continue to be difficult to displace.
CONCLUSION
While the structure for international taxation put in place in
the 1920s has been remarkably stable, modern theories have
emerged to explain and evaluate that system and its alternatives.
As we have discussed in this Article, the current theories contend-
ing for supremacy in this area are capital export neutrality, capital
import neutrality and the misnamed national neutrality.337 It has
by now become well-known in the tax policy literature that it is
simply not possible to implement both capital import and capital
export neutrality simultaneously.338 Our favorite way of making
this point is in terms of an irreconcilable conflict among the fol-
lowing three simple principles:
Principle 1: People should pay equal taxes on their income
regardless of the country that is the source of that income. In
particular, U.S. taxpayers should be treated equally regardless of
the source of their income.
Principle 2: All investments in the United States should face
the same burden regardless of whether a U.S. person or a foreign
person makes the investment. In other words, U.S. and foreign-
owned investments and businesses should be treated equally.
Principle 3: Sovereign countries should be free to set their
own tax rates and to vary them as their domestic economic situa-
tions demand.339
The essential difficulty is that the first two principles can hold
simultaneously only when capital income is taxed at the same rate
in all countries. This requires identical tax systems, including iden-
tical tax rates, an identical tax base, and identical choices between
337. See supra notes 85–91, 171–78 and accompanying text; see also JOINT COMMIT-
TEE ON TAXATION, supra note 25, at 246.
338. See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 25, at 246.
339. This way of putting the dilemma was first expressed in a speech given on March
1, 1990 to the U.S. chapter of the International Fiscal Association by Michael Graetz,
when serving as Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) in Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania. See International Tax Policy Makers Should Strive for Balance, Treasury Official
Says, BNA DAILY TAX REPORT, Mar. 2, 1990, at G–7. The speech was subsequently
delivered again and published by Kenneth W. Gideon, then the Assistant Secretary. See
Kenneth W. Gideon, Dinner Speech, 9 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 71, 72–74 (1991). Principle 1
states a requirement of capital export neutrality. Principle 2 states a version of capital
import neutrality, although it also expresses a desire for nondiscrimination either in favor
of or against foreign-owned businesses and investments.
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source and residence based taxation. That has never happened,
and it never will. Even if it ever did, there would be no way to
keep such a system in place without violating Principle 3. More-
over, bilateral treaties in which the United States gives benefits to
certain foreign investors or foreign-owned businesses, in exchange
for their countries giving reciprocal benefits to U.S. persons, will
also defeat the ability to satisfy simultaneously both Principles 1
and 2. This difficulty makes compromises between these principles
inevitable. Such compromises, in turn, have made the tax law gov-
erning international transactions subject to routine complaints of
competitive disadvantage by U.S. companies depending on where
they are competing and against whom. As a result, in practical
political terms, the modern theories have proved little more useful
than the ancient theories, such as “economic allegiance,” which
they have replaced.
In the meanwhile, as we wait for improvements in theory and
knowledge, we could do much worse than to follow the basic
principles and priorities established for international tax rules by
T.S. Adams. We should remember that it was not economic theo-
ry, but first, concerns for the essential unfairness of both double
taxation and zero taxation, and second, a preference for source-
based taxation of business income, based on the view that the
nations where such income is earned both are entitled to a share
of that income and will claim such a share, that most shaped his
policy recommendations and, in turn, U.S. tax policy. In addition,
T.S. Adams’ approach emphasized the enlightened selfishness of
nations; certainty, administrability and enforceability of internation-
al tax rules; and nondiscrimination against foreigners. Finally, given
T.S. Adams’ role in helping to fashion a stable and generally suc-
cessful international income tax regime for the United States and
his influence in the League of Nations tax treaty effort, we proba-
bly should take with a grain of salt Adams’ general admonition
that anyone “who trusts wholly to economics, reason and justice,
will in the end retire beaten and disillusioned,” in that “hard
game” of tax lawmaking.340
340. Adams, Ideals and Idealism, supra note 276, at 12.
